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+ Kybd& Zen de Aru - "Collaboration is Everything"
(Organizing slogan for the Japanese Research Program
in Very Large Scale Integrated Circuits)
+ "The Japanese have the poorest spirit for cooperation."
Nippon Oil President Naito referring to failed oil
cartels in the 1920's.
I. INTRODUCTION
In 1934 Joseph Schumpeter theorized that the essential
challenge for economic development is to appropriate benefits of
research and innovation by simultaneously protecting and employ-
ing proprietary information. His model of innovation incor-
porates: insight (invention), organization (entrepreneurship),
risk-taking (investment), and profits (rents) in a linear, staged
relationship that ends with the diffusion of the innovation. The
Schumpeterian notion that has long dominated economic thinking is
simple: "proprietary information drives the capitalist engine."1
If Schumpeter is properly credited with identifying the link
between invention and economic growth, Japanese industry is
popularly credited with transforming that relationship. Japanese
industrialists and policy planners have long recognized that the
1 Nelson (1984) p.10. Schumpeter (1934) stresses the role
of the individual risk taker, the entrepreneur. Schumpeter
(1942) addresses technology management in the modern corporation
where specialized, bureaucratized, and captive R&D units provide
firms with special powers to direct technological change in the
marketplace.
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3potential for waste, duplication, and other misallocations of
scarce resources is the hidden obverse of competition for control
of proprietary information. The secrecy and patent protection
that are the essence of Schumpeterian competition and that are
required for the appropriation of innovation by firms can produce
unneccessary as well as better mousetraps. Put differently, what
benefits individual firms may not equally benefit whole
economies. The broader economic impact of misallocated scare
research resources can be profound, especially in an environment
of escalating R&D costs and particularly in a nation like Japan,
where "excessive competition" is an excessive preoccupation. As
many have observed, antimonopoly law has never stood between
Japanese industrial policy and the desire of firms to enhance
their international competitiveness.2
It is not odd, therefore, that public and private coopera-
tion in research would seem so important in Japan. In the realm
of doing things together, "collaboration" in Japan was, until
very recently, "collusion" in the United States. In the realm of
doing things alone, "individualism," an idol of the Western
tribe, often is in Japanese terms, mere "selfishness." Per-
ceptions of Japanese successes achieved through what appear to be
quite different fundamental assumptions about the nature of
competition and the organization of research have stimulated
reassessments of Western practices. This paper will attempt to
map Japanese practices in a preliminary effort to explain them.
II. RESEARCH COLLABORATION
One looks in vain for analysis of interfirm collaborative
research in the Western literature on research and development
published before 1970. Leading texts often refer only to cartels
and collusion, the costs of which were often too numerous to
enumerate. 3 These costs were firmly embedded in theories of
microecomic behavior and were enshrined in legal practice.
2 Yamamura (1984) is an excellent review of how Japanese
patterns of research collaboration and lax antitrust enforcement
are related. He notes, for example, that in sharp contrast to US
experience, only four cases involving the Antimonopoly Act and
the Patent Law have been filed in postwar Japan. See Patrick
(1986) and Samuels (1987) for extended discussions of this
general point.
3 For example, see Scherer (1970), a standard text in which
"collaboration" is not even mentioned. In its alphabetical and
symbolic place in the index is "collusion," replete with
cross-references to "cartels, and "price-fixing," totaling 26
pages.
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4To reconstruct the orthodox view, the disadvantages of
cooperative research were both economic and legal; cooperation
was as much a disservice to the firm as to the economy as a
whole. For the firm, cooperation would limit the appropriation
of innovative ideas. Shared benefits make investment in inven-
tion less attractive. Firms' investments in cooperative research
and development would commit scarcefunds and personnel and would
entail concession and compromises with partners; collaboration
could only dilute a firm's own technology strategy. Researchers
would serve too many masters. Too much time would be spent on
coordination, too little on generating useful (appropriable)
knowledge.
In the broader economy, cooperation would stiffle competi-
tion, thereby retarding technological development. It would
preclude (or at least severely limit) multiple paths to invention
that would, through potentially multiple inventions, have the
broadest economic benefit. It would dull the incentive to be
creative. The total pool of independent innovative activity in
an economy would be reduced, and thd savings and efficiencies
derived from avoiding duplication wuld accrue unequally to the
largest and most powerful participating firms. Worse, col-
laboration might "spill-over" from the laboratory to the factory,
thereby becoming anticompetitive and market distorting. Large,
lazy research programs might be substituted for multiple leaner
and more imaginative ones.
Yet, collaboration and competition may not be as incom-
patible as theory suggests; a paradox is suggested by several
current developments: In some businesses, financial, economic,
and managerial know-how have replaced embodied technology as a
leading source of market advantage. In addition, fantastic
reductions in product life cycles coupled with equally fantastic
increases in front end costs, and lnger, more uncertain product
gestation periods, 4 often result in the enhanced technology
intensity of manufactured products nd manufacturing processes.
In short, the emergence and strategic significance of entirely
new commercial technologies with unprecedentedly short half lives
have challenged planners and practitioners alike.
Their ideas and solutions have increasingly and consistently
invoked new forms of institutional combinations -- and interfirm
research collaboration in particular. Here is the paradox:
Firms have responded to challenges for technology intensification
not only with Schumpeterian emphases' on proprietary activities,
but in also with new linkages to ext ernal sources of ideas. Many
established firms are measureably leiss self-sufficient in
technology; they are less confident Ithey can generate autono-
mously the innovations needed for growth, and they are unsure
4 The United States Department lof Commerce estimates that
only one out of twenty laboratory projects result in a positive
cash flow for private firms. See Fe lker (1984).
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5they can capture the rent even from their own innovations.
Increasingly it seems that the risks of non-collaboration are
judged to be greater than the risks of collaboration. Schum-
peter's model notwithstanding, large and small firms alike,
needing to stay active in broader technical areas, have turned to
what what Fusfield and Haklisch have called "the external
reservoir of science and technology and to develop linkages with
outside sources..."5 and to a strategy that Mytelka calls the
"delocalization" of research. 6
Mytelka reports that in the United States industry-sponsored
university and nonprofit research expanded two-thirds faster than
in-house research between 1967-1977. By other accounts, more-
over, this "de-localization" accelerated even more recently.
Haklish has documented the sharp increase in the number of
technical alliances outside the firm since 1981.7 A separate
survey of major American corporations also finds that although
technology development has expanded both within firms and collab-
oratively, external sources of technology have grown in impor-
tance relative to (and at the expense of) internal technology
development. No longer are there two distinct modes of tech-
nology strategy, the small, rifle-like entrepreneurial, "Silicon
Valley" type and the large, diversified, shotgun-like corporation
that can pursue several technological leads simultaneously. The
two have become fused in what Horwitch calls a "post-modern"
technology strategy.8
The rifle and the shotgun have become an automatic weapon
and the Japanese have been embedded in these changes as both
trigger and target. Fusfield and Haklisch (1985 p. 61) help us
make this connection:
"The dramatic Japanese export successes in fields
across the industrial spectrum have had the greatest
impact on US attitudes (toward research
collaboration). The ability of Japanese firms to
cooperate in carefully selected areas of microelec-
tronics development, combined with Japan's greater
emphasis on communication and planning between govern-
ment and industry, has shaped the thinking of US
companies."
5 Fusfield and Haklisch (1985) p.7 3 . This group at New York
University has completed several major studies of research
collaboration in the semiconductor industry and more generally in
industrial research.
6 Mytelka, (1986).
7 Haklisch (1986).
8 Horwitch (forthcoming) Chapter 6.
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6European thinking has been equally affected by Japanese
developments. Research collaboration traditionally has been
viewed in Europe as "hardly more exciting than the work of the
local post office;" it has been compared to a dog walking on its
hind legs: "it is not done well, but you are surprised to find it
done at all." 9 Yet, in the last five years the British govern-
ment initiated its Alvey programme of cooperative research in
computer science modeled directly upon the Japanese Fifth
Generation Project, the European Strategic Program for Research
and Development in Information Technologies (ESPRIT) was begun,
and other collaborative research initiatives (such as Eureka and
BRITE) were undertaken to fortify Europe's weakening technology
base in the face of Japanese and American competition.1 0
Interfirm technical linkages can take different forms, some
of which challenge the notion that competition and collaboration
are zero sum strategies. Some, such as joint research ventures
and university-based consortia, may be considered "precom-
petitive" while others such as mergers and acquisitions, may be
seen as "preemptive."ll In the first instance, the exchange of
research and technical information can be a very informal and 
inexpensive process of professional interaction. The currently
proliferating licensing, cross-licensing, second-sourcing, and
customer-supplier development agreements that are directed at the
exchange of know-how are often more formal. When information
does not yet exist and therefore when there is nothing yet to
exchange, technical alliances may involve yet different types of
formal arrangements, ranging from joint research ventures, and
participation in large research consortia situated at neutral
sites such as national laboratories or universities. These
arrangements are "precompetitive" to the extent that they create
or diffuse knowledge that is subsequently embodied in products.
They are "preemptive" to the extent that this knowledge limits
the number and range of products in the marketplace.
This essay will review several of these technology strate-
gies in greater detail, especially in Japan. At this point,
however, we note merely that both "preemptive" and "precom-
petitive" technology strategies can confer benefits upon partici-
pating firms and upon the economy more generally. The "pre-
competitive" case is the easiest to make. The sharing of risk
and costs far upstream where these risks and costs are greatest
and where personnel resources are scarcest are the most com-
9 Woodward (1965) p. 3 8 -9 .
10 For more on European research collaboration, see Mytelka
(1986), Vernon (1974), DeForest (1986), Johnson (1972), and Alic
(1986).
11 The former term is from Fusfield and Haklisch (1985).
The latter term is mine, and is related to the notion of tech-
nology oligopolies introduced below.
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7pelling among many rationales for joint research. Other argu-
ments frequently cite such factors as the streamlining of the
"lumpy" process of technical innovation and the avoidance of
wasteful duplication that, by freeing engineering talent, make
additional projects possible.
The challenge, of course, is to find a mechanism to allow
participating firms to capitalize on each other's expertise and
complementary capabilities without distorting makets and chal-
lenging the broad social and economic benefits of competition--
such as lower costs, lower prices, better service, expanded
consumer choice, and efficiency gains. This is why the case for
"preemptive" strategic technical alliances is the more difficult
to articulate. It seems more convincing when particular sectors
in national economies are threatened by foreign competitors. It
is therefore best understood as a technology conscious industrial
policy.
Such a policy has modern origins in the engineering research
association of Great Britain established during World War I. It
has been refined by the Japanese, who argue that the central
benefits of research collaboration are not economic efficiencies,
but technology diffusion and enhanced flexibility and competi-
tiveness on world markets. "Preemptive" alliances are excused
(indeed, they have often been enshrined) in Japan, for their
contribution to technology diffusion and to the "leveling-up" of
the,nation's technology base. In Japan, at least, the technology
oligopolies currently replacing product oligopolies are under-
stood as facilitators rather than as inhibitors of new busi-
nesses.12 We will explore why and how these polices are adopted
after first exploring the variety of factors that might poten-
tially affect technology alliance strategies.
III. VARIATIONS ON THE THEME: GENERIC HYPOTHESES
In identifying the factors that influence these strategies
it is useful to separate generic hypotheses about interfirm R&D
from those that may apply unequally to different national
systems. In the next sections we present the generic hypotheses
and use them to inform the review of Japanese practices that
follows.
1. Stage
The first factor is the stage of the research activity.
Although research on research has rejected the idea of a linear
12 This distinction is owed to Mytelka (1986).
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8path from idea to product,1 3 there are important differences
between the most basic research and activities associated with
the development of a specific product. It is easy to imagine
that firms are more willing to cooperate when their shared
objective is furthest from the marketplace. Disincentives for
collective behavior should grow as projects become products.
A study of the British research associations in 1972
identified a slightly different pattern: Cooperative R&D was
least attractive when the projects were both closest to and
furthest from the product development stage. 14 The competitive
concerns that inhibit technology cooperation downstream can be
matched by a general lack of interest in outside linkages
furthest upstream where there seemed no obvious application or
near term benefits.
This suggests a critical distinction between what many refer
to as "base" versus "key" technologies. Agreement among partners
about where generic technology ends and proprietary knowledge
begins seems essential for productive collaboration. Mytelka
suggests that firms enter into sponsored or joint basic research
in order to liberate internal resources for proprietary projects
that enhance their competitiveness in the market. She notes that
the difference between key and base technologies has been deeply
affected by inverse trends toward compressed product lifecycles
and technology intensification. Products that have the shortest
life cycles, such as software, pharmaceuticals, or aerospace are
those for which there is the greatest investment in research.
Wood products, heavy chemicals, and tobacco are at the other
extreme. These dual developments, she argues, have compelled
firms to spend ever more for basic research, and as a result,
firms seem more willing than previously to work harder to define
clearly the "generic" technologies they can develop jointly.1 5
13 Allen (1977).
14 Johnson, 1972. But note that Johnson's sample were
research associations that were comprised only of firms in the
same business or sector. A hypothesis developed below will
account for the extensive inter-firm collaboration in product
development.
15 Mytelka (1986); Fusfield and Haklisch (1985) note that
there is little collaboration in biotechnology but a great deal
of collaboration in microelectronics in the United States. Their
explanation posits a comparison of biotechnology in the 1980's to
microelectronics in the 1960's, noting that each was then in a
"highly competitive stage in which patentable processes and
know-how are of great importance...In this stage companies may be
unable to identify opportunities for cooperative activity..."
This particular stage-based explanation becomes puzzling when one
notes the proliferation in the mid-1980's of biotechnology
research consortia in Japan.
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9Incentives for interfirm collaboration that vary by the
stage of the research project are thus complicated by sectoral
and structural considerations. Let us explore each briefly in
turn.
2. Market Structure
Relations among firms and the ways in which they are
individually and jointly related to specific markets can combine
with the stage of research in three patterns of collaboration:
horizontal, vertical, and cross-sectoral.
Horizontal research collaboration, projects undertaken by
firms in the same business, are the most difficult to justify
theoretically. Absent the national policy incentives referred to
above and explored in greater detail below, we would expect
direct competitors to combine only their most basic research
activities. Under conventional assumptions, these combinations
are more apt to be associated with large numbers of small firms
than with small numbers of large, oligopolistic firms.
Vertical joint R&D, among firms in different parts of the
same business (such as steel and automakers or ceramics and
semiconductor manufacturers), is a more likely research combina-
tion. Its modal form should be in product or process develop-
ment. Collaborative development of this kind, where each partner
contributes expertise at different points along the innovation
process, should broaden and stimulate competitive markets in ways
that horizontal associations do not.
One might theorize, therefore, that as basic research
becomes more applied, the attractiveness of joint research
increases for vertically related firms, but decreases for
horizontally related ones.
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FIGURE ONE
ONE RELATIONSHIP OF MARKET STRUCTURE
TO THE TECHNOLOGY PROCESS
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Perceived
Benefits
Low
Basic
Horizontal
Groups
ertical
Groups
, ._ . -
Applied
Stage of Research
There is also cross-sectoral research collaboration, among
firms in different industries. These combinations may portend
the emergence of entirely new businesses. In the case of
breweries and pharmaceutical firms, for example, contributions
from each promise to revolutionize the manufacture of ethical
drugs using fermentation technologies. Often labeled "strategic
alliances" in the current management literature, these combina-
tions are reportedly more common than before.1 6
Another way to consider the relationships among structure
and stage is to theorize that joint basic research is more
appropriate for (and perhaps even most common among) firms in the
same business while joint applied research is the domain of firms
in different businesses within the same industry. Firms from
entirely different industries can be expected to enjoy the
benefits of both applied and basic collaboration:
16 Haklisch (1986) p. 1-2 reminds us that even more signi-
ficant than the "headline" projects in microelectronics, such as
MCC, SRC, Eureka, VHSIC, VLSI, etc., are the many interfirm
"technical alliances," the strategic partnerships that "consti-
tute an intricate mosaic of both national and international
technology transfer mechanisms." McKensie and Company is often
credited with coining the term "strategic partnering."
·es*Bs ..... 1.
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FIGURE TWO
A SECOND RELATIONSHIP OF MARKET STRUCTURE
TO THE TECHNOLOGY PROCESS
Joint Basic Research -| HorizontalAssociations
Cross-
Sectoral
Associations
Joint Applied Research, Verticalaions
Finally, it seems prudent to consider the nature of capital
markets as well. In economies where equity and venture capital
markets are well developed, it seems likely that incentives for
interfirm collaboration are reduced. Where entrepreneurs with
ideas can fund them readily, they will have less need to balance
the benefits of cost sharing with the costs of benefit sharing.
3. Sector
The most common sectoral rationale for collaborative
research is the "laggard" or "gap" hypothesis.1 7 This holds that
technological disparities among firms within and across sectors
best explains patterns of joint research. Put simply, research
collaboration should be more common among lagging firms and in
lagging sectors than where firms and sectors are at the state of
the art. Consortia of "laggards" are directed at normalizing and
diffusing knowledge rather than at creating it. One might expect
17 This argument is widely articulated. See for example,
OECD (1965), Sigurdson (1986), and Doane (1984). Woodward (1965)
concluded that cooperative research is best suited to sectors
with large numbers of competing firms where technology is
not highly developed. Murphy (1982) p. 25 reports the view of
one participant in Japan's VLSI project: "The weakest gained the
most..."
-- -- I
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technologically backward firms, sectors, and nations to engage in
and to benefit from collaboration more than technologically
advanced ones. This hypothesis is therefore limited to consortia
for technology diffusion.
Consortia for technology creation are explained by a
corrolary, what might be called the "state of the art
hypothesis." Presumably, firms will come together when their
collective technology base is at the frontier and needs to be
pushed forward faster than any single firms could do on its own.
Thus, we can expect laggards to participate in collaborative
research where knowledge is diffused and leaders to participate
in consortia where knowledge is created.
Another explanation for variations in patterns of joint
research is related to the relevance of technology to a par-
ticular sector. As noted above, some businesses are more
technology intensive than others. Traditional heavy industries,
such as steel, automobiles, and chemicals are likely to be more
development-intensive than electronics or biotechnology, where
proprietary "key" technologies become generic "base" technologies
with startling speed. Strategies for cooperative behavior,
therefore, should vary by sector and by stage on the basis of ;the
centrality of research, the nature of the collaboration, and
rates of technological change, regardless of the distribution of
technology within an industry. Leaders and followers alike will
be more apt to collaborate in technology intensive sectors than
in backward ones.
Finally, the centrality of a sector to national security is
apt to affect patterns of collabortion. In the United States,
for example, coordinated research and development has long been a
feature of defense and space related businesses. It seems
plausible to hypothesize that consortia proliferate in particular
sectors not only because it makes business sense, but because it
makes policy sense as well. Hence, we will be compelled to
integrate business and government in the analysis of collab-
orative research and development.
4. Firm Size
First, however, we can entertain two different possibilities
for the effect of firm size on patterns of interfirm research
collaboration. On the one hand, large firms with large research
staffs are presumably less likely to rely heavily upon external 
sources of technology. Put differently, it seems much easier to
explain research collaboration among small and medium sized firms
than among large firms in oligopolistic sectors, where collusion
is more common downstream in markets than in research upstream.
Haklisch, et al. (1984) conclude that "other things being equal"
the share of an industry's total R&D conducted collaboratively
will increase when the firms in that industry are smaller, when
-WBaa
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that industry's capital/labor ratio is higher, and when its
exposure to foreign competitition is greater.
Yet, we have already noted that large firms rely extensively
upon externally generated technology; the risks and the costs
associated with research have escalated so rapidly in the past
decade, that even the largest firms find themselves unable to
cover all their technological bases. We may simply note that in
the United States, the several initiatives in the 1980's for
collaborative research in microelectronics involved virtually all
of the largest firms. 18 Likewise, in Japan, thirty large firms
account for about one-third of the membership of
government-sponsored research associations. The five largest
steel companies are together in seven of these and the six
largest electrical machinery producers are together in twelve.
Even a small part of a giant firm's research budget spent on
collaborative projects can dwarf a large percentage of a small
firm's budget spent the same way. Many of the same American
firms that have the largest absolute levels of in-house research
are also the most active participants in university-based and
other research consortia. Large firms may have the most to gain
from joint research precisely because they also have the most
sophisticated internal research apparatuses. This is suggested
by historical studies that have determined in-house expertise,
rather than making external projects unnessar , actually facili-
tates its use and enhances its desireablity.l 9 Put differently,
joint R&D is better viewed as a complement to, rather than as as
a substitute for, internal corporate research. Other things
being equal, therefore, bigger firms should be found engaging in
more, and perhaps bigger, collaborative projects.
For these various reasons it is difficult to suggest an
unambiguous relationship between firm size and the propensity to
engage in joint research. Other factors explored above and
below, such as exposure to foreign competition, the technology
intensity of a given business, the diversification of specific
firms, and the distribution of technology within an industry, all
seem more relevant.
5. Labor markets
We can be reminded that individuals as much as institutions
decide to collaborate and share technological information and
18 For merely the most recent example, note the role of IBM
in stimulating a consortium of chip manufacturers, as reported in
The New York Times, 6 January 1987. For a more detailed analy-
sis, in this same sector, see Haklisch (1986).
19 Mowrey (1983).
__I____^_XI· I
14
ideas. Incentives for them to do so will vary significantly, but
one can imagine that where labor markets are fluid and where
opportunities for professional advancement across firms are
maximized, opportunities and incentives for informal exchanges
will be particularly well developed. Professional associations
may therefore play a particularly important role in the transfer
of technology across firms and sectors (and one that is different
from the role of trade associations noted above). Information
networks ("invisible colleges") of professionals trained in the
same graduate programs or formerly employed by the same firms are
apt to become channels for sharing ideas. Von Hippel (1986) has
explored this "informal know-how trading" in the United States
and finds it a widespread, inexpensive, and flexible form of
cross-licensing that goes far beyond the exchange of technical
data.
Where labor markets are less fluid and where opportunities
for this sort of cross-fertilization are less well developed, we
can expect one of two outcomes. Either innovation will be
stifled by the high institutional walls that separate research-
ers, or else researchers, recognizing the benefits of interaction
and concerned with the consequences of not collaborating, will
work harder than they otherwise would to create formal oppor-
tunities to collaborate. In short, where labor markets are
fluid, informality should characterize collaboration, while
formal forums should supplement existing networks where labor
markets and professional mobility is constricted. Labor markets
vary more considerably by national systems than by sectors within
national economies; we are directed therefore toward examining
national institutions and practices, particularly those in the
public sector.
6. Public institutions and public policy
The Schumpeterian model of innovation and competition high-
lights proprietary technology, private institutions, and profit
motives but fails to account for the public sector role in
economic change. 2 0 This essay has likewise addressed interfirm
research collaboration as if it exists in a policy vaccuum and as
if firms and their strategies are all that matter. As we shall
demonstrate in the Japanese case, public institutions and public
policy can affect patterns of research collaboration in a great
many ways.
The first is related to science education. Where univer-
sities serve as both a source of technical manpower as well as of
basic research, they can add significant depth to corporate
research programs. It is not difficult to imagine that
university-firm research collaboration will be better developed
20 Nelson (1984) p. 13.
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where universities have the best developed research capabilities,
and where they encourage sponsored research. This will most
likely obtain where universities, rather than firms, have the
responsibility for the advanced training of technical personnel.
The second is economic and industrial policy. These policy
environments are central to any discussion of research collabora-
tion. Subsidies, grants, tax incentives, regulation, state
enterprise, public procurement, and other programs designed to
enhance the breadth and depth of a national technology base can
both lead to and be lead by an active state bureaucracy. Of
course, there can be no research collaboration absent relaxed
anti-trust enforcement. In the first instance, however, the
nature and extent of state transfer payments and other fiscal
incentives for collaborative research will depend upon
business-government negotiations. Often these negotiations will
ratify and reward arrangements previously negotiated among the
firms themselves. Analaysis of national policy projects and
initiatives in research collaboration must first address these
negotiations.
It must next address the nature and extent of state inter-
vention in markets. Where the economic bureaucracy enjoys juris-
diction in markets, and where that jurisdiction can be separated
from control of those markets, then the promotion of research
collaboration can be market-conforming and will be welcomed by
market players. Where the bureaucracy has neither control nor
jurisdiction vis-a-vis research collaboration, firms are free to
combine and distort markets on their own. In the most difficult
case for business-government relations, firms are likely to
resist and even to subvert public policy for research col-
laboration where state control and jurisdiction are fused.2 1
21 This argument is more fully developed in Samuels (1987).
_
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IV. INTRODUCING JAPANESE FACTORS
To this point we have suggested six sets of generic hypo-
theses concerning the factors that should faciltitate or inhibit
reasearch collaboration. The Japanese case can both inform and
illuminate the relationships identified above.
1. Stage
There is no obvious reason why our general expectation that
technology strategies will vary by the stage, or distance from
the marketplace, applies differently in Japan than elsewhere.
For example, Doane's study of Japanese joint research in elec-
tronics concluded that the extent of interfirm cooperation varies
over time in the same project.22 Likewise, there are no indica-
tions that the difference between base and key technologies is
less central to Japanese technology strategies than elsewhere,
even if the terms are used indiscriminantly in Japanese.23 If
anything, current research on Japanese technology policy suggests
that Japanese participants in joint projects work longer and
harder to identify where generic technnologies end and propri-
etary ones begin than do others. If Japanese patterns of
research collaboration are different than those that obtain
elsewhere, it is likely to be more related to questions of market
structure, business-government relations, and to sectoral
characteristics than to stage alone.
2. Market Structure
For quite different reasons, we can expect both horizontal
and vertical patterns of interfirm research collaboration to be
more highly developed in Japan than elsewhere.
Japanese firms, especially the largest ones, enjoy a dispro-
portionate and oligopolistic voice in economic policy making.
Industry and trade associations are formally represented in
government councils, and their deliberations and preferences are
routinely enshrined as public policy. Trade associations,
comprised of horizontally-related competing firms, routinely
exempt themselves from antirutust regulation in Japan. One
result may be patterns of horizontal research collaboration that
22 Doane (1984) p. 141.
23 Note that the word kihon, literally "base," "foundation"
or "fundamental," is officially translated as "key" by the
Japanese government when reference is made to the new semi-public
Key Technology Center (See below and Look Japan September 10,
1986).
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are exaggerated by Western standards.
We have different reason to believe that vertical combinati-
tions may be equally exaggerated. It is widely appreciated that
new products and processes arise from combinations of expertise
and technologies broader than single firms (even large multi-
divisional ones) and single sectors. Japanese finance and
industry centered groups (keiretsu), with their interlocking
directorates and through their routine interaction at the most
senior level ("presidents clubs") should be a major influence
facilitiating vertical research consortia.
This is directly related to the nature of Japanese capital
markets in two ways. First, Japan's underdeveloped equity
markets foster extensive corporate debt that may provide large
banks and their finance centered groups with strategic informa-
tion about a wider number of firms. This, in turn may enable
Japanese banks to play a more significant role in bringing firms
together for joint research than banks elsewhere. Second, as
Saxonhouse (1985) and Yamamura (1984) convincingly argue,
investment capital does not flow perfectly competitively in
Japan's heavily regulated financial system. One result might be
that "signaling" or "targeting" sectors for collaboration based
upon extensive business-government discussion might be neccessary
compensation for turgid capital flows.
3. Sector
Sectoral differences must therefore be factored into our
explanations. The "laggard" and "state of the art" hypotheses
articulated above may have special relevance, for Japan has had
experience with both conditions within the recent past. In the
case of the former, firms in technologically backward sectors
relied heavily upon collaboration for technology transfer in the
1950's and 1960's. A conventional expectation is that as they
matured and approached the technological frontier they would
invest more in their own labs than in joint facilties. In such
sectors as automobiles, steel, shipbuilding, and optical devices
there should be fewer government sponsored research associations
and joint national projects in 1987 than in 1957.
But apparently the reverse has obtained. One explanation is
that the nature of joint research in Japan has shifted from the
normalization of information to the creation of knowledge in
Japan. Japanese firms have built upon their history of interfirm
cooperation and have put their collaborative institutions and
norms to new purposes. In short, we expect to find that research
collaboration in Japan has increased because the nature of that
activity has become more fundamental.
_______II _1_1----
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4. Firm Size
Two points about Japanese firm size seem relevant to
explanations for patterns of research collaboration. First, the
largest Japanese firms are often vertically integrated. There-
fore, quite apart from their group associations, big Japanese
firms are apt to be engaged in a greater variety of businesses
than big Western firms. This is certainly true of certain
leading high technology sectors, such as microelectronics, where
Japan's largest chip makers are also Japan's largest computer and
consumer electronics manufacturers. Deals and compromises made
in collaborative ventures in one sector can be exchanged by these
same firms in very different business areas. This alone should
make the Japanese case different.
Second, Japan's many small, technology-intensive manufactur-
ing firms cannot be ignored. In some sectors, such as machine
tools and software, the small and unaffiliated firms are the
technology leaders. The extent to which these firms collaborate
in technology devlopment, with each other as well as with their
larger competitors, will be very important for completing the
conventional picture of centralized research collaboration in
Japan.
5. Labor markets
Although interfirm labor mobility for technical personnel
seems to be increasing rapidly in Japan, it remains the rare
scientist or engineer who has worked for several unrelated
firms.24 This has several implications for explanations of the
nature and extent of joint research in Japan. First, as Saxon-
house (1985) convincingly argues, the Japanese permanent employ-
ment system reduces opportunities for profession-based communi-
cations. More formal collaborative projects therefore become a
potentially significant forum for the sorts of informal indivi-
dual exchanges that take place in professional associations
elsewhere. This need is made more urgent by the fact that firms,
rather than graduate and professional schools, train the bulk of
Japan's technical workforce. Hence the limited cross-firm
contacts that do exist, such as undergraduate class bonenkai and
joint research projects, are cultivated to compensate for Japan's
comparatively underdeveloped professional labor market.
This might also explain the formal nature of interfirm
collaboration in Japan. American firms, even when they do agree
to participate in joint research, seldom release key personnel
for the collaborative venture. Joint research ventures are
24 See the activities and publications of the Nihon Recruit
Center, particularly Beruf, its magazine for engineers seeking
new jobs.
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typically responsible for hiring their own personnel from the
general technical labor force. Technology is transferred to the
"cooperating" parent companies in what might be called "stock-
holder collaboration," through site visits, publications, and
other "hands-off" procedures.2 5 Japanese collaboration seems to
depend much more upon the circulation of engineers from parent
firms to joint ventures. Technical personnel are rotated in and
out, usually for 1-2 year periods, taking their contacts,
know-how, and training back to the parent firm.
6. Public institutions and public policy
Understanding institutional continuity is essential for
understanding Japan. Most of the leading Japanese research
universities are national universities funded directly by the
Ministry of Education, Culture and Science (Monbush6).
Industry-university ties were quite strong in the interwar years
and during the Pacific War, but the pacifism and anti-business
ideologies of the first generation of postwar intellectuals
discredited campus collaboration with industry. 2 6 One way to
view interfirm research collaboration in Japan is to understand
it as compensation for the relatively underdeveloped relations
between leading research universities and the private sector.
The role of the Japanese government in nurturing research
collaboration will be explored in detail below. Here we merely
anticipate a paradox concerning government structure and patterns
of research collaboration in Japan. Much sociological and
political research on Japan has characterized public adminis-
tration in terms of "sectional centralism" or "functional
fragmentation" (tatewari gybsei).2 7 This refers to the ways in
which the mutual insularity of and competition among admin-
istrative units contributes to duplicated and overlapping policy
programs in Japan. Explanations for the success with which
Japanese public policy facilitates and nurtures collaborative
research must be reconciled with these centrifugal forces. We
will not be surprised to discover multiple, overlapping, dupli-
cative research consortia, each under the aegis of a separate
ministry vying for control of its larger share of policy research
funding.
25 Admiral Bobby Inman, former head of the Microelectronics
and Computer Corporation, describes this as "sipping (the jointly
developed technology) with a long straw." See his interview in
The New York Times September 5, 1986.
26 Inose, Nishikawa, and Uenohara (1982).
27 See Nakane (1970) for the sociological model. See
Samuels (1983) and Reed (1985) for its application to public
administration.
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It is entirely plausible that the Japanese government and
industry promote research collaboration to compensate for
rigidities in the labor market, for underdeveloped capital
markets, for the loss of tariff protection, for the absense of
military research and for the underdevelopment of
university-based sponsored research. 2 8 Nonetheless, there seem
to be an equally compelling set of factors facilitating Japanese
research collaboration that exist quite apart from the need to
take special compensatory measures. These include the nature of
industrial and financial groupings, oligopolistic capital and
product markets, sectoral variations, and bureaucratic
politics. Let us therefore review what is known about Japanese
patterns of research collaboration in order to evaluate these
explanations more completely.
V. REVIEWING THE JAPANESE EVIDENCE
1. Stage
Doane corroborates the hypothesis above by concluding
that: "The form and nature of (interfirm) cooperation for
innovation changed as Japanese industries moved from catch-up to
the original innovation stage. t' 29 When most technology was
imported, cooperation was rather a simple matter. Early col-
laborative projects were designed merely to diffuse technologies
and thereby to raise the technological floor of Japanese indus-
try. Technicians and managers from different firms met as often
as neccessary to monitor their separate progress; they were
sometimes brought together by a central coordinating office
within an industry association or a government ministry.
Collaboration to raise technological ceilings is more
complicated, for it requires more than coordinated diffusion; it
requires the setting of research goals themselves. Doane
demonstrates that where interfirm (in this case horizontal)
collaborative innovation has succeeded it needed to be some
distance from the market. The establishment of clear goals and
reliance upon a central, neutral coordinating mechanism by firms
of relatively equal expertise were, in her view, made possible by
the pre-commercial nature of the undertakings.
28 These "compensatory" explanations are best articulated by
Yamamura (1984), Saxonhouse (1985),and Okimoto (1987).
29 Doane (1984) p.125; See also Sigurdson (1986).
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Yet, there is evidence that applied research and product
development account for the bulk of research collaboration in
Japan, and that these associations pay off in commercial
markets. The ratio of joint applications in published Japanese
patents doubled in electronics, and rose by 40% in industrial
machinery between 1974-1982.30 In high tech "fine" ceramics, it
increased by nearly 50% in the two year period 1980-1982. A
government survey found, moreover, that less than 14% of inter-
firm collaboration was directed at basic research. One-third was
defined as "applied" and over half was considered "develop-
ment.,31
One way to understand this is to remember that basic
research is always the lowest priority for firms that need to
generate profits. This is no less true for Japanese firms. The
relevant comparison is not with applied and developmental
research, but with basic research undertaken within single
firms. Systematic data are not yet available.32 But it seems
reasonable to infer that the share of joint basic research is
growing in tandem with proprietary basic research, as Japanese-
firms shift from being consumers to being producers of new tech-
nologies. 3 3 Unfortunately, we cannot yet determine which is
growing faster. No studies beyond those cited offer systematic
analyses of how these shifts in stage helped shape shifts in
procedure and organization of joint research. More work,
preferably longitudinal, is indicated here.
30 Tomiura (1985) p.2 3 . Note however, that in electronics,
the level is very low: 2%.
31 Rokuhara (1985) p.4 0 .
32 What does exist is anecdotal or firm specific. Tomiura
(1983 p.26) classified 20% of Nippon Steel's 300 research
projects as "basic." The largest category concerned research in
manufacturing processes. Fourteen per cent of the total were
"joint" research projects with other firms.
33 This pithy characterization is from Dore (1983) p.7.
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2. Market Structure
The incidence of interfirm research collaboration is
accelerating in Japan.3 4 Earlier in this paper we proposed
reasons why both vertical and horizontal alliances might be
especially pronounced in Japan. Let us explore the data avail-
able on each.
Vertical joint research is more common. Four fifths of all
cooperative research in Japan is conducted by firms in different
businesses.3 5 These firms are often related by historical and/or
capital ties to the same industrial or financial group. Such
affiliations are very common in certain business, such as nuclear
power, synthetic fuels, oil exploration, telecommunications, and
seabed mining. The result is the emergence of an oligopolistic
set of six or fewer similarly structured technology projects.
Several of the most recent of these arrangements are listed in
Table One:
34 Rokuhara (1985) p.3 7 . This report from the Japanese Fair
Trade Commission's Office of Economic Analaysis includes a
comprehensive survey of collaborative research practices, with
data collected from more than 200 large and small firms across
six sectors.
35 Suzuki (1986) p. 59. The case of Nippon Steel is
illuminating. Tomiura (1985) reports that the ratio of joint
applications in patents filed by Nippon Steel in 1984 reached 20%
of the total. Of these, more than 90% were filed with firms in
different businesses.
- I --- ----------
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TABLE ONE
COLLABORATIVE RESEARCH PROJECTS
ORGANIZED BY JAPANESE INDUSTRIAL GROUPS
(1985-1986)
GROUP PROJECT # FIRMS DATE
MITSUI Bioreactor Research 9 8/85
Electronic Shopping 2 10/85
Hardened Concrete 2 10/85
Bioengineering 25 3/86
MITSUBISHI Synthetic Cable 2 10/85
Industrial Robots 3 11/85
Metal alloys 2 12/85
SUMITOMO Industrial Robots 2 12/85
Computer Chemistry 2 3/86
FUYO Plating 2 n/a
DKB Industrial Robots 3 6/85
Banking Software 2 8/85
Automated Steelmaking 2 11/85
Fine Ceramics 2 12/85
Radio Darkroom 2 4/86
SANWA Auto Parts 2 8/85
Biomaterials 3 11/85
Bioreactor 3 4/86
Artificial Intelligence 19 4/86
Biotechnology 12 5/86
Source: Keizaich6sa Ky6kai, ed. Keiretsu no KenkyQ Vol. 27
(1986).
While interview data suggest that firms look first to
members of same roup for research partners, survey data tell a
different story. Group-centered joint projects may be prefer-
red for Japanese business investment decisions, but they are much
less prominent in research. More than four-fifths of vertically
structured joint research (83%) is organized among otherwise
36 See Doane (1984) p. 214 for interview data.
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unrelated firms.3 7
There are also other indications of significant levels of
intergroup, vertical and cross-sectoral research alliances.
These may be created after the separate groups first try to
consolidate on their own, but find costs prohibitive and efforts
duplicative. One such example is in aerospace; in 1984 the major
groups' trading houses, materials, and vehicle manufacturing
firms separately established research committees for space
utilization technologies, but with extra incentives provided by
MITI and the STA in December 1985, they all came together under
the aegis of the "Space Environment Utilization Center." 38
But public sector incentives are not necessary to bring
non-competing firms from competing groups together. There are
many recent examples of such collaborative R&D projects. These
cross-sectoral or "diagonal" strategic alliances represent an
historically unprecedented combination of traditional group
centered associations (vertical) and trade association arrange-
ments (horizontal). Given the formal nature of vertical and
horizontal associations in Japan, we might call these hybrids
diagonal. Whatever their label, however, they are considered
"shocking" 3 9 by a leading Japanese business data organization:
37 Ksei Torihiki Iinkai Jimukyoku (1984) p. 2 0 .
38 This Center is most likely the progenitor of the Spring
1986 Space Environment Studies Project, one of the first projects
funded by the new "Key Technology Center" of MITI and the
MPT. (See below and Appendix).
39 Keizai Ch6sa Ky6kai, ed. (1986).
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TABLE TWO
RECENT EXAMPLES OF COLLABORATIVE R&D
ACROSS JAPANESE INDUSTRIAL GROUPS
(1985-1986)
Date
7/85
9/85
9/85
9/85
Structure
Diagonal/
Horizonta
D
D
Mitsui
--Toyota
Mitsui
Ship-
buildir
H
D I Mi tsui
Bussan
10/8 D
1/86 H Toshiba
1/86
2/86
2/86
D
H -------H 
H :Toray
Mitsubishi
1 tsublshi -
Denki
_________.-
Mi tsubi shi
Rayon
i tsubishi
Electric
Sumitomo
NEC
NEC
Fuyo
..______
----------t-------
Sumitomo 
Metal s
NEC
…-… - __________--- --_---- -.
Mitsubishi
Shoji
Mitsubishil NEC
Electric I
DKB JDescription
iWelding Technology
Fuji Denkil Fishing
Fujitsu
C. Ito
Fujitsu
Technology
with Hitachi, NTT;
Optical Communica-
tion System
with Hughes Com-
munications;
Satellite
Plastic Magnet
with Hitachi;
Ishikawa- Space Experimenta-
jima Itation Center
Harima
I
---------- 1------------------
Shimizu 1with U. of Texas;
Construc- Biotechnology Firm
ti on
Fujitsu with NTT;
iOptical Communica-
iti on System
----------- ----------------- ------ - - ----------------
Sumitomo Kuraray .Bio Materials
I Electric
Sumi tomo
Bakelite i
…___1…- --------- … --------- ------------------_  __ __
Mitsubishi Takeda
Kasei harmaceut-
ical
Mitsubishi
Trust Bank
Mitsubishi NEC
Electric Matsushita
--_ -_ _-_ _-_ _-_ _- -_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ 
Toa- Kyowa Protein Laboratory
Nenryo Hakko 
Yasuda Banking Software
Trust Bank
---------- -----------------______---
Fujitsu with Hitachi,
Tokyo University;
"TRON Project"
-- - - - - - - - - -- - - -
-- -- - - - -
Source: Keizaichosa Kyokai, ed., Kelretsu No Kenkyu Vol. 27, 1986.
Toray3/86
3/86
4/86
D
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H
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Thus, there is mixed support for our hypothesis that a large
amount of vertically organized joint research in Japan can be
explained by the ologopolistic group structure. One explanation
for the high and possibly increasing incidence of "diagonal"
collaboration among unrelated firms may be related to the role of
public policy in stimulating collaboration of this type. Group
affiliation may be less important when alternative forms of
financing and other incentives are available. We return to this
below.
The remaining one-fifth of all joint research in Japan is
conducted by competitors organized horizontally. There are three
vehicles for this kind of collaboration. The first is the
industry association. Japanese industry associations are
extremely active in technology monitoring and diffusion. They
are forums for collaboration and "know-how trading" of all sorts,
and deserve much closer attention from researchers, especially
because they are exceptionally influential in economic and
research policymaking.4 0 The second is the formal contract for
project-specific alliances among firms. While some of these, such
as the recent Hitachi-Fujitsu agreement to develop a 32 bit (and
later a 64 bit) microprocessor will emerge from private initi-
ative and without obvious government support, preliminary
indications are that horizontal alliances seldom succeed without
or beyond the government sponsorship.41
The third vehicle is the publicly supported engineering
research association (See below). The five largest steel firms,
for example, participate together in seven such associations, but
very little of their private research is done collaboratively. 4 2
Likewise, the "big six" electrical machinery manufacturers have
participated together in nearly a dozen of these associations,
usually in very large scale and highly visible "national pro-
jects." But other horizontal research collaboration seems more
limited. The evidence currently available suggests that hori-
zontal joint research, long nurtured by government policy, has
40 See Lynn (1982) and Lynn and McKeown (forthcoming) for
the best work in this area. Dore (1983) p. 2 4 speaks of this in
the context of "the guild tradition of competitor cooperation."
Yamamura (1984) sees the industry associations as the critical
link between the firms and MITI in the selection of participants
for national projects.
41 The Hitachi-Fujitsu deal demonstrates that in rapidly
changing markets, joint development need not be vertically
structured. They are sharing a $100 million development cost to
establish their own (preemptive) standard for the industry. See
The Wall Street Journal November 3, 1986.
42 We need better evidence to argue this point without
reservation, but see Tomimura (1985).
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never quite weaned itself. When it succeeds, moreover, it seems
to require a clear division of labor that includes an operating
norm Doane refers to as "separate but together." 43
3. Sector
There is clear sectoral variation in patterns of research
collaboration in Japan. The Fair Trade Commission survey
reported that the incidence of interfirm research has increased
faster in chemicals and electronics than in automobiles.44 This
may be explained by the already extraordinary level of vertically
related automotive product development projects. The automobile
firms are not active members of the horizontally structured
research associations although steel, electronics, and chemical
industries are; this is likely because their joint research is
conducted independently between manufacturers and parts suppliers
up- and downstream. Parts manufacturers and steel companies
regularly send personnel for 1-2 years to the auto manufacturers'
research faciltities in Japan.4 5
43 Doane (1984) p.1 5 8. She also notes (p.143) that the
government's role in faciltiating horizontal research col-
laboration began when the Ministry of Communications (Teishinsho)
brought together NEC, Oki, Fujitsu, and Hitachi to back-engineer
and improve imported equiptment. After the war, she reports,
these same firms agreed with NTT that they would collaborate to
design and build their own equiptment.
44 Rokuhara (1985).
45 Charts detailing the extent of this vertically organized
network of joint development projects for two (unidentified)
automobile manufactures are published in the Long Term Credit
Bank Report No. 78 January-February 1985.
T -_ - -_ _ -
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Data on joint patent applications tell a different story,
however:
TABLE THREE
JOINT PATENT APPLICATION BY SECTOR (1982)
PERCENT OF TOTAL
SECTOR JAPANESE PATENT APPLICATIONS NUMBER
ELECTRONICS/
COMMUNICATIONS 2.8% 73,392
AUTOMOBILES 1.6% 12,816
CHEMICALS 6.1 8,217
MATERIALS 8.5% 13,290
TOTAL 3.6% 107,715
Source: Rokuhara (1985) P.42.
Despite the extent of vertical interfirm research linkages, the
automobile sector exhibits lower than average commercial benefit
from joint research. The materials firms, while generating
fewer joint patent applications in absolute terms, seem to focus
more of their total research on collaborative projects.
Vertical interfirm collaboration is also very important for
the rapidly growing fine ceramics industry. A 1982 industry
association study revealed that ceramics firms have realized very
little success from collaborating with each other.46 Instead,
they report fair success and much experience with collaboration
with firms in entirely different businesses. Product application
and the product manufacturers do seem to come from historically
unrelated businesses:
46 Cited in Rokuhara (1985) p. 3 4 -6 .
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TABLE FOUR
JOINT MATERIALS RESEARCH IN JAPAN
(1985)
Materials Firm Partner Development Activity
Nippon Tokushu Togyo
Hitachi
Kyocera
Kyocera
Nippon Kagaku Togyo
Kurosaki Yogyo
Asahi Glass
Taki Chemical
Showa Kogyo
Asahi Glass
Nichi Asu
Toray
Kyocera
Toshiba Ceramic
Kyocera
Toshiba
Riken
Nissan Diesel
Isuzu
Nippon Piston Ring
Toyo Soda
Nippon Steel
Nippon Steel
Nippon Steel
Kawasaki Steel
Nippon Kokan
Bona Intanashyonaru
Arusu Hamono
Shibaura Denshi
Toshiba
Honda Motors
Toyota
Ceramic Diesel Engine
ax It 
Ceramic Auto Parts
PS-2
Compound Ceramics
Refractory Bricks
Fireproof Structures
Fireproof Heterogenous
Structures
Silicon Iodide
Ceramic Fiber
Cutting Devices
Heat Sensor
Single Crystal Silicon Iodide
Ceramic Engine
Ceramic & Gas Turbine
Source: Rokuhara, 1985, p. 35.
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At the present time, the industry is hampered by ceramics
manufacturers without applications experience and by steel and
other traditional materials firms that do not understand the new
technologies well. Initiatives for research collaboration have
come predominantly from the older, larger materials firms
upstream, rather than from the users. As recent investments in
silicon fabricating facilties in Japan and abroad reveal, these
same steel and aluminum firms are also attempting to master the
new materials technologies on their own.47
Collaborative research also characterizes the nascent
biotechnology industry in Japan. More than one-third of Japanese
biotechnology firms were engaged in collaborative research in
1982.48 Many of these firms are much smaller than those in the
automotive or ceramics industry discussed above, and most of
their collaboration is conducted in horizontally structured
government research consortia.
On the basis of the secondary literature concerning sectoral
differences, it is difficult to confirm or reject hypotheses
about the relationship of stage and structural variables.
External research in mature industries, such as automobiles, and
in emerging but commercially viable ones, such as ceramics, are
each more apt to be vertically structured and development
oriented; external research in emerging, but pre-commercial
sectors, such as biotechnology is apt to be fundamental and
horizontally structured.
It is difficult to have confidence in these generalizations
for two reasons, however. First, the number of cases is small
and the available evidence is very limited. Second, it seems
likely that firm size and sectoral priority in national policy
are better explanations for these variation than is stage. We
turn next, therefore, to an examination of these explanations for
joint research in Japan.
4. Firm Size
The evidence relating firm size to patterns of joint
research is ambiguous. Between 1980-1982, there was a 60%
increase in the number of interfirm contracts for joint research
and development among firms smaller than 10 billion yen. Such
contracts among firms larger than that rose by less than half
47 Note for example that Nippon K6kan, the world's fifth
largest steel maker, is building a silicon plant in Oregon in
1987, and that Kawasaki Steel entered the custom chip business in
1985.
48 Cited in Hane (1986).
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49that rate (38%) in that same period. It is possible that this
growth is high because there is so little collaboration to begin
with among small firms. A separate survey of numerically con-
trolled machine tool manufacturers in Sakaki Village, where more
than 300 small firms form the gr'eatest concentration of such
manufacturers in the world, found that 75% of the firms do not
cooperate in R&D, and that the remainder do so only
occasionally.50
Joint basic research, like basic research more generally, is
far more common in large than in small firms.51 But
institutional forms of interfirm collaboration in Japan do not
markedly vary by firm size. For small and large firms alike,
more than 90% of joint research and development projects are
undertaken through contracts, rather than through government
consortia or formal joint venture arrangements. It is inter-
esting to note that small firms are somewhat less active parti-
cipants in engineering research associations than large firms.
This is of interest because these associations were first
established by law to raise the technology base of small and
medium sized Japanese firms.
Although it is difficult to be confident about generali-
zations derived from these limited data, it seem that these
associations have been transformed in Japan, and that our earlier
hypothesis about the utility of joint research for larger firms
remains viable. This is further supported by the finding that
large Japanese firms contract for joint research at twice the
rate of small ones.52
5. Labor Markets
Existing research on Japanese research collaboration neither
confirms nor refutes the hypothesis that joint research is
designed to compensate for underdeveloped labor markets. At best
we have snapshots of particular projects and professional
associations that provide forums for researchers from different
firms to discuss technological developments or to advance a
49 Rokuhara (1985) p.3 7 .
50 Friedman (1986) Chapter Five.
51 Rokuhara (1985) p. 4 0 -4 1 reports that 17% of joint
research by firms larger than 10 billion yen is basic research
compared to just 8% by the smaller firms in his survey. Overall,
as reported earlier, "basic" research accounted for 14% of all
research collaboration.
52 Rokuhara (1985) p. 3 6.
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particular state of the art.
One such account reports significant differences between
Japanese and American engineering professional associations.
Eagar observed that extensive technical committee meetings,
usually full-day, stand-alone conferences (rather than adjuncts
to annual business meetings), were particularly effective
mechanisms for "normalizing knowledge." He concluded that
Japanese professional societies provided "the glue which holds
Japanese universities, national laboratories, and industries
together and contributes not only to excellent communication of
new technology but also to considerable cooperative research." 5 3
Eto concurs. He argues that professional societies have played a
"decisive role" in shaping interfirm research agendas in
Japan. 54
Lynn has reported that Japanese engineers are more apt to
attend a greater number of professional mettings than are
American engineers. His preliminary data contradict conventional
wisdom, suggesting that one-fifth of his Japanese sample, but
only one twentieth of his American one, attend more than five
professional meetings per year.55 These conferences surely play
a different role than in America, where members are more likely
to use these bodies as clearinghouses for job information and
professional contacts. What is not yet clear, however, is the
extent to which firms in Japan would rely less on these associ-
ations if engineering manpower was more flexible and less loyal
to particular firms. Neither is it clear that these formal ties
replace, rather than supplement the kinds of informal know-how
trading that is so common among American engineers. In the
absence of reliable cross-national data, we can only withhold
final judgement about how labor mobility affects patterns of
interfirm research in Japan. We do know rather more about the
impact of public institutions and public policy.
6. Public Institutions and Public Policy
53 Eagar (1986) p. 3 3 says that this process includes
debriefings in which engineers who had been abroad report
to the rest of the membership, and prebriefings in which drafts
of papers for international conferences are circulated and
critiqued before presentation. See also Chapter Seven of Lynn
and McKeown (forthcoming) for a comparison of the role of trade
associations and collaborative research in the US and Japan.
54 Eto (1984) p. 1 9 3 -5 .
55 Preliminary data presented by Leonard Lynn at the 1987
annual meeting of thre American Association for the Advancement
of Science, February 16, 1987, Chicago.
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We have already noted that proactive Japanese government
policy toward research collaboration offers sharp contrasts to
more passive American policies which (at best and only recently)
have moved to dismantle regulatory barriers. The role of
Japanese public institutions in shaping and directing joint
research must be understood in the context of the factors
outlined above. But the truly "key" technologies may be
political, organizational, and social: viz., the evolved capa-
bility of the Japanese state to respond flexibly with broadly
acceptable measures to maximize social benefits without sacri-
ficing private gains. Better yet, it is the capacity of the
Japanese state to satisfy itself and private actors that private
gains and public good are not incompatible. We explore these
solutions and this process below.
6.1 The Process: An Overview
The process by which interfirm research collaboration
becomes an object of public policy in Japan is not well under-.,
stood. Far more attention is paid to a project after it is
announced and after a technology is "targeted" for collaborative
development, than is paid to the consultative process that
creates it. On balance, however, announcement of a joint
research project is better viewed as the beginning of the end of
that project than as the end of its beginning in Japan.
The beginning of the beginning is always very informal, and
is seldom well documented. In most cases, an industry
association initiates discussions; less frequently, government
officials take the lead.56 But debates about whether this
process is industry or government-initiated can be unproductive.
Private researchers work hard to find ways to collaborate and
their collaboration legitimately involves government officials at
every stage. Protracted planning and exhaustive consultation
ensure only that participants are committed to the success of a
project. This participation is significantly facilitated by
public incentives deserving closer scrutiny.
Most accounts stress three distinctive features about
56 Pepper, etal. (1985) p. 2 2 0 sketch the process by which
R&D consortia are created in Japan. They also describe the
creation of the Biotechnology Research Association and its
origins in an industry "roundtable" (kondankai). Doane (1984)
argues that with the exception of NTT's procurement-based
collaborative development programs, most joint research in Japan
is "industry initiated." (p.159). Yamamura (1986) stresses
MITI's "open leadership" of joint research projects. See also
the accounts by Dore (1983), who stresses the role of junior
officials, and an excellent report by the US Congressional office
of Technology Assessment (1983).
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cooperative research in the public sector. The first, noted
above, is the extraordinary time and effort invested in front end
planning and consultation. This investment, apparently repaid,
is facilitated by the oligopolistic structure of Japanese markets
as described above, and by the interdependence of state and
market actors. Public officials need not concern themselves with
assessing the commercial prospects for a technology they have
agreed to champion, because they can be confident that these
choices were derived from industrial deliberations. The second
is the way in which these deliberations result in public support
to facilitate rather than to direct industrial research.5 7 Here
is the distinction made above between state jurisdiction and
state control. It seems that public incentives for joint
research in Japan succeed when they involve state actors as
neutral arbiters, not as forceful leaders. Not every project
succeeds, of course, but by most accounts the most visible
failures are those imposed upon participants. 5 8
The third speaks to the intersection of bureaucratic
politics and consensus-building in Japan. Collaborative research
is typically multiple and parallel. A reasonable metaphor for
this is a "hive" in which many participants work separately for a
common product. Very rarely do firms come together under the
auspices of a publicly funded project to work side by side in a
common laboratory on a daily basis. Instead, tasks are finely
divided, and frequently two or more firms are expected to explore
different experimental paths to the same goal. 5 9
There are two (not mutually exclusive) explanations for why
collaborative research in Japan is rarely undertaken compre-
hensively. The first casts the process in a positive light. In
this view, because every effort is made to preserve proprietary
possibilities while harvesting collaborative benefits, divisions
of labor are preferred. They are the logical result of the way
consultative process is embedded in organizational practice, and
often, in law. The second possiblity is that the multiple
jurisdictions of Japanese public administration produce a "noise"
in the system which prevents the participants from completely
trusting and cooperating with each other. In fact, it is
possible that private firms that reach a modus vivendi find
intrabureaucratic rivalries the greatest obstacle to the smooth
and efficient implementation of their programs. Although
inter-ministerial collaboration in science and technology is not
57 See Alic (1986) for a balanced appraisal of this point.
58 Dore (1983) p. 2 2 makes this important point. See also
Doane for an examination of the relationship between failed
projects and intrusive public officials.
59 Doane (1984) p.140 and Nagao (1985) p. 9 provide details
about divisions of labor for the Super High Speed Computer
Project, PIPs, and Fontac.
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unheard of (note the 1967 creation of JIPDEC by MITI and MPT),
duplication may actually be modal.6 0
6.2 Finance
The budget process imposes a significant degree of dis-
cipline on joint research in Japan. On balance it seems that the
centrifugal forces of bureaucratic politics that encourage and
sustain multiple projects are offset by the centripetal forces of
centralized budgetmaking requiring comparative evaluations of
projects and annual justification by public champions. Checks
and reviews of joint R&D projects are conducted annually, and are
measured against current progress and final objectives. Ac-
companying documentation is awesome in scope and detail.
Japanese government R&D budgets, raised from special
accounts, general revenues, and from legal gambling, are spent
two ways. The first is in the form of institutional overhead for
government laboratories and national universities. The other,
more relevant to interfirm research collaboration, is in the form
of transfers to private firms entrusted with assigned research.
These transfers, in turn, take two forms. They may be loans or
they may be subsidies.
Of course, neither public subsidies nor loans are postwar
innovations. The Japanese government has been subsidizing
industrial research since the early Meiji period. While outright
grants remain significant, especially for basic research that
firms would not otherwise undertake, it is widely known that the
Japanese government directly funds a smaller portion of private
sector-research than does any other major industrial state. It
is less widely known that this public sector share of Japanese
research spending dropped below 209 in the mid-1980's.
A "conditional loan system" was first instituted during the
1930's (Kok6gy6 Gijutsu Shiken Kenkya Hojokin). Loans were not
repaid unless profits were shown. By 1955 these funds comprised
more than one-third of all private firm spending on research in
Japan. At that point firms began to invest their own funds in
proprietary research, and the government's conditional loan
program was redirected to support collaborative research. In
1955, less than ten percent of all conditional loans supported
60 One example was the reaction of at least three other
ministries to the 1981 MITI announcement of a ten-year bio-
technology research consortium. The STA, MAFF, and MHW each
responded with a cooperative research project of their own. Two
of the leading sociologists of Japanese science discount the
importance of these bureaucratic politics. Dore (1983 p.26)
argues that they matter only "at the margin." For Lynn (1986),
they are mere "turf battles" and are insignificant in comparative
perspective.-
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collaborative R&D; by 1963 this increased to 41%. In 1983 a new
system (Sangy6 Kasseika Gijutsu KenkyU Kaihatsu Hojokin ) was
established to support joint R&D exclusively. It cannot be
distributed to single firms or individuals. Since the
"conditions" attached to repayment are so (purposely) under-
specified, "success conditional loans" (hookin) should be
considered as no different than subsidies. 1
Today four fifths of all Japanese government loans (about
one-fifth of the research budget for MITI's AIST laboratories
plus an equal sum from the Japan Development Bank) are extended
to joint projects. In 1987 these loans are pegged at 6.8% and
allow up to 15 years for payback. The ratio of government loans
to government subsidies is actually greater than unity when the
special accounts budgets are included.6 2 Since firms must be
members of designated non-profit research consortia to qualify
for these conditional loans, it is clear that the Japanese
government subsidy system is disproportionately generous to joint
research projects. These collaborative projects are by defini-
tion in the "public interest," hence they receive priority in
budgeting. Thus, the Japanese government does not merely
encourage firms to do joint research, it ays them to do it.63
These direct and indirect payments are justified by the MITI
estimate that a successful product developed with government
support will generate ten times that amount in tax revenues.
This seems a handy justification for the government's relative
disinterest in forcing repayment of "success conditional
loans. 64
The tax system also provides incentives for ordinary
corporate research in Japan; tax benefits seem less overtly
skewed than loans to favor collaborative research. There are
numerous tax benefits for corporate research spending: Firms may
elect to reduce their taxes by 20% of their total R&D expendi-
tures less their highest R&D expense in the previous year (small
and medium sized firms have an additional option here). In
addition, after 1986 they began to enjoy a 7% property expense
reduction for R&D in "key" (targeted) technologies. The most
explicit tax benefit for collaborative research allows firms to
depreciate capital equipment used in joint projects by a full
100% in the first year of a project. Each research consortium
may own its on equipment nominally valued at one yen, and fixed
property taxes for joint research ventures are reduced to 75%
61 Interview, MITI official (June 22, 1987).
62 Suzuki (1986) offers a systematic review of public
funding for joint research in Japan.
63 This point is Spalding's (1985).
64 See Sakakura (1984;) for these arguments from MITI's
perspective.
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after three years. Donations made to such ventures can be taken
as a tax loss.6 5
Public support for collaborative research does not stop with
subsidies, grants, or tax benefits. Research in national
laboratories can also involve the participation of researchers
from private firms. In 1986 two new programs were introduced to
enhance cooperation between MITI's Agency for Industrial Science
and Technology (AIST) laboratories and neighboring private
firms. A total of almost 500 million yen was set aside to
provide these firms access .to AIST equipment and to introduce
commercial themes to the government laboratori'es. 6 6 Individual
AIST laboratories had already initiated these activities. MITI's
Electrotechnical Laboratory (ETL), for example, already supports
a small number of (usually corporate) research internships each
year under the aegis of its "Cooperative Research Program." More
important, .however, are the "Technical Guidance Internships"
funded by private firms for collaborative reseach done at ETL.
In 1984 there were 140 such visitors, mostly Japanese corporate
researchers, who were working at ETL for 1-3 years. 6 7 The use of
public facilities 'is often as important as the use of, public
funds or the deferral of public taxes in stimulating research
collaboration in Japan.
6.3 Intellectual Property
As one might expect, this extensive pattern of collaboration
in Japan raises difficult questions about intellectual property
rights. All government commissioned research, joint or other-
wise, is the property of the government. However, by most
accounts, licenses are widely available to firms on a
non-discriminatory basis. Governm-nt funds loaned to private
laboratories that result in patentable discoveries require only
repayment, and even then only if commercially successful. In
these cases, the property rights belong to the firms themselves.
But since, as noted above, these success conditional loans are
used predominantly for joint research, there is the complication
of determining which firm within a consortium, if any, owns the
65 These tax benefits are outlined in Kgy& Gijutsu Volume
27, Number 4 (1986).
66 The AIST is the research arm of MITI. It supervises
sixteen national laboratories in a variety of applied fields,
including the Electrotechnical Laboratory, the Mechnaical
Engineering Laboratory, The Fermentation Research Institute, and
the National Chemical Laboratory for Industry. For details on
these programs see Kgy5 Gijutsu Volume 27 Number 4 (1986). For
an overview of the AIST laboratories, see Anderson (1984).
67 Strauss (1986) p.7 5 .
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patent. Fiscal austerity and administrative reform in Japan even
further complicates this problem. After 1981 the Ministry of
Finance (MOF) tightened requirements for "success-conditional
loans." They continue to prefer outright "contract research"
under the terms of which all equipment and patents become the
property of the state. But analysts say that patent ownership is
negotiated on a "case-by-case" basis to accomodate the private
partners.68
6.4 Institutional Arrangements
The Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI)
Collaborative research has significance for bureaucratic
politics as well as for economic competitiveness. MITI's role,
is best characterized in three ways. First, it acts as cheer-
leader vis-a-vis the Finance Ministry for industrial research.
Firms that want additional resources need MITI to make their
case. Second MITI is a champion vis-a-vis the Fair Trade
Commission and the courts. Collaborative research is an area
requiring MITI's special attention because exemptions from
antitrust laws must be obtained for the participating firms.
Third, MITI is a coordinator of industrial (and now increasingly
more basic) research. Its "national projects" uniformly require
the neutral, credible, and authoritative forum that only the
leading economic and industrial policy bureaucracy can provide.
With the exception of technical staff at AIST labs, senior
MITI officials are nearly all trained in law and economics. They
do not have sufficient technical expertise to pick projects and
target technologies without extensive collaboration with industry
and academic experts. Although the first formal stage in the
creation of a research association are requests for proposals
tendered by MITI, this typically comes well after MITI and the
relevant industry groups have negotiated the terms of a new joint
venture. Each bureau within MITI routinely commissions these
groups, for example, to report on research in progress and to
identify particulary attractive prospects. This report is
thereupon circulated and amplified in formal consultative
hearings of adhoc and permanent advisory committees, including
the influential Industrial Structure Council. 69 The process may
68 There is little comprehensive analysis of changing
government policy in this area. See Dore (1983), Suzuki (1986),
Saxonhouse (1985), and Nagao (1985) for some details.
69 Dore (1983) provides case studies. Nagao (1985) and
Sigurdson 1986) outline the RA creation process. Sakakura (1984)
is a MITI official's view of "picking winners."
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take as long as three years. MITI formally selects participants
in joint research projects, but participation is voluntary, not
coercive. No firm participates unwillingly, and few willing ones
can be easily excluded.
Indeed, cases of non-collaboration deserve special attention
beyond what is now available in the secondary literature.
Contrary to much of what is written about consensus and coopera-
tion in Japan, it is not uncommon for the leading firm in a
particular sector to shun joint research. Saxonhouse (1985)
notes that although all the major Japanese chemical firms
participate in government funded collaborative research, they
tend not to join projects in their own areas of technological
leadership. There is evidence that this is true in other sectors
as well. Showa Denko, for example refused to participate in an
AIST'polymer conductivity research association, choosing instead
to proceed with its own research on polymer batteries. Tanabe
Pharmaceuticals did likewise in bioreactors. When MITI estab-
lished its interfirm project to develop flexible manufacturing
systems, it invited Mitsubishi, Toshiba, and Hitachi to collab-
orate on a $60 million eight year high power CO02 laser design
project. Hitachi, judging itself to be well ahead of its
competitors, refused. MITI then helped fund Toshiba and Mitsu-
bishi, and today all three firms have comparable laser tech-
nology. An effort by MITI to engage the cooperation of pharma-
ceutical firms in a recent chemical technology project resulted
in so many refusals that AIST funds had to be assigned to each
firm separately. 7 0 To be sure, MITI is not powerless to induce
firms to participate. But it is inducement, rather than compul-
sion that is the key to understanding the process and structure
of MITI support for collaborative research. Without extra-
ordinary incentives, often structured by the participants
themselves, MITI research collaboration would be far more
limited.
The engineering research association (ERA) administered by
MITI is the most common instrument for government-supported
interfirm collaborative research. ERA's today account for 6% of
all joint research conducted among Japanese firms.7 1 Virtually
all collaborative research that involves five or more firms is
organized as a research association. These research associations
are established as non-profit legal entities for specific
projects. Ordinarily, funding is shared between private firms
70 The Showa Denko case is from Dore (1983). Saxonhouse
(1985) mentions Tanabe and bioreactors. The laser case is from
Eagar (1986). The Chemical case is from Suzuki (1986).
71 Suzuki (1986). This figure seems low because, as
reported above, 90% of all interfirm research collaboration in
Japan is undertaken by private agreement between two firms. Once
the number of firms increases, however, so does reliance upon
government funding and the ERA formula in particular.
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and the government, although participating firms can enjoy
significant tax and other benefits from ERA membership even if
there are no government financial transfers. Once the specified
business of an association is completed, it is either dissolved
or its by-laws are ammended to redirect the members firms toward
a new project. Research associations have the same legal status
as trade associations.
Like many Japanese institutions, the ERA was borrowed from
abroad.7 2 Dr. Masao Sugimoto, Director of MITI's Mechanical
Engineering Laboratory (Kikai Shikenjo) in the late 1950's, was
impressed by a British system of cooperative research associ-
ations that had been created after WWI out of concern that
Britain was losing its technological leadership. 7 3 Of particular
interest to Sugimoto (and to the Japan Auto Parts Industry
Association that lobbied for new public research initiatives) was
the support provided by the British government through ERA's to
small and medium sized firms. These were precisely the firms
most in need of technological assistance in Japan as well. The
first research associations were ad hoc, subsidized by Sugimoto's
lab and supervised by the Japan Auto Parts Industry Association-.-
Not one- of the 47 firms that participated in the first four ERA's
in filters, suspensions, radiators, engine parts had research
facilities of their own. The lab and the industry association
collaborated to provide central facilities for the collection of
data and for shared equipment.
The ERA system was legally established in 1961 under the
Research Association for the Promotion of Mining and Industrial
Technology Act (Kbgyb Gijutsu Kenkyf Kumiai H). Small and
medium sized firms remained the primary target and the purpose
remained applied rather than basic research. Between 1961-1965
twelve RA's were established and their sectoral composition began
to broaden. Their average life was nearly fifteen years. None
were created between 1965-1970.
This hiatus requires further investigation, but if our
generic hypotheses above are correct, we can presume that it was
related to two converging trends. The first was the coming of
age of small and medium sized manufacturing firms in Japan. They
72 Westney (forthcoming) is a comprehensive study of
foreign organizational borrowing. This account is from Sigurdson
(1986).
73 Sugimoto had worked for Hitachi before WWII. He
returned to Hitachi in 1964 after a distinguished career at MITI
and after serving as the Director of the Science and Technology
Agency. Sigurdson (1982) and (1986) is a more complete account
of the history of Engineering Research Associations in Japan.
See Kgy6 Gijutsuin ed., (1985a) for compete details on the
legal, financial, and administrative regulations guiding the
operation of Japanese ERA's.
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had less need in 1965 for horizontal collaboration than they did
in 1955; they also probably had less interest in diffusing
technology to their competitors, since by this time it was likely
to be their own technology. The second was that the larger,
technically sophisticated firms had not yet begun to turn -their
resources toward basic research. As these firms approached
technological frontiers by the early 1970's, they were apt to
discover the value of collaboration for the purpose of technology
creation, and they were apt to find the ERA a convenient vehicle
to implement new collaborative associations.
In fact, an ERA "boom" came between 1971-1983 when Japan's
largest firms began to participate in earnest. Fifty-nine
research associations were established in that period
(twenty-five between 1981-1983 alone), representing fields as
diverse as polymers, aircraft jet engines, microelectronics, fine
ceramics, and biotechnology.7 4 Average membership and the
average size of member firms both grew. The smallest among the
thirty firms that had participated in five or more ERA's by 1983
had sales of more than 200 billion yen. The average sales of
these most active participants was nearly one trillion yen.
At the end of 1985 fifty-two of the seventy-nine ERA's
established under the 1961 law were still operating, but their
raison d'etre and the nature of their participants has now been
transformed. Small and medium sized firms still participate in
these ERA's (136 firms belong to only one association), but eight
firms are active in ten or more, and thirty firms account for
nearly one-third of the memberships. Sigurdson points out that:
"Engineering Research Association objectives have
shifted from generating specific technical results
to that of broadly influencing certain industries
or a whole industrial sector." 7 5
This has been abetted by a shift in MITI policy that encourages
the use of ERA's for broadly based, basic research oriented
"national projects." Among these have been the successful VLSI
Project among others in microelectronics, materials science, and
biotechnology.7 6 Government support for engineering research
association doubled between 1977-1982. Today Japanese firms
seldom use the ERA system unless government funds are introduced
to support it; rarely do they conduct research at a common site
any longer. This has led some to argue that they have become mere
"recepticles" for government funds, and that their "main role" is
74 See Appendix A for a full list.
75 Sigurdson (1986) p.1 0 .
76 Fourteen firms joined the MITI Biotechnology Research
Association in late 1986. Twenty joined the Bioreactor Research
Association.
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the distribution of government funds rather than as a vehicle for
research per se. 7 7
There are several other important institutional foci for
MITI-supervised joint research. One is the public corporation.
Administrative reform and fiscal austerity in Japan have made the
creation of these off-line "public policy companies" more
difficult in recent years. Nevertheless, several of the most
important "national projects" involving collaborative research
among firms with public support are organized this way. One is
the New Energy Development Organization, directed equally by MITI
officials and by senior private sector leaders; another is ICOT,
administrative home for the well-publicized Fifth Generation
Computer Project. Another alternative to the Research Associa-
tion is the research cartel invoked under the Structurally
Depressed Industry Law. Here firms in a designated sector are
encouraged to collaborate in order to qualify for specially
earmarked research funds as part of the government's overall
effort to rationalize industry structure 78
Much of MITI's jurisdiction in facilitating research
collaboration followsfrom previous successes and failures.
Research associations are sometimes created only after more
ambitious efforts to consolidate or otherwise restructure an
industry collapse. This was the case of the VLSI and other
computer technology development projects. 7 9 Frequently, whole
77 Rokuhara (1985) p.50-1 mentions the gasohol and alumina
powder research associations in this context. See also Suzuki
(1986) p.4 3 . While most RA's are involved in basic or applied
research, several, such as the super high performance computer
and VLSI projects have been directed at the development of
products for the marketplace. See Yamamura (1984) for details on
the former and Sigurdson (1986) Doane (1984), and Sakakibara
(1983) for details on the latter.
78 See Johnson (1979) for an overview of the public
corporation in Japan. Samuels (1981) details the New Energy
Development Organization. Feigenbaum and McCorduck (1983) and
Strauss (1986) provide details on ICOT and the Fifth Generation
Project. See Young (1985) for more on this law and Samuels (1983)
for more on the research cartel in aluminum.
79 Nelson (1984) reports that MITI designs for a "national
champion" to compete with IBM met the same fate as previous
efforts to consolidate the automobile industry. The set of three
collaborative research groups was merely the resulting "com-
promise" between MITI and the manufacturers. Doane (1984) offers
a more detailed summary of MITI's failure to consolidate Japanese
computer firms by pairing them. She recounts the case of Hitachi
and Fujitsu, brought together by MITI, who reached a tentative
division of labor that each violated almost immediately. See
also Murphy (1982) p. 1 4 .
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sectors find themselves in difficulty that they attribute to MITI
policy. Problems such as excess capacity in aluminum or petro-
leum refining that MITI policy had abetted, and trade frictions
in businesses such as steel or textiles, whose export drives MITI
nurtured, have led policy planners to consider an enhanced
upstream role for the economic bureaucracy.
One initiative of this sort was the 1981 "Next Generation
Base Technologies R&D Program" through which MITI established a
jurisdiction further from the market than it had earlier ven-
tured. Initially, twelve projects were identified in the areas
of a) new materials (fine ceramics, high efficiency separateion
membranes, conductive polymers, highly crystalline polymers, high
grade alloys under crystal growth control, and composite materi-
als), b) biotechnology (bio-reactors, large scale stable cell
culture, recombinant gene engineering), and c) electronic devices
(super lattice elements, 3-D integrated circuits, and fortified
integrated circuits). Research was organized in five new
research associations involving 28 government laboratories, 80
private firms, and 134 universities. Total spending by the AIST,
the supervisor of these projects was anticipated to be 100 .
billion yen over ten years (the average life of these projects
was projected to be 9.6 years). In 1986 6.5 billion yen was
budgeted.80
Other MITI initiatives are even more recent and are closely
related to complex bureaucratic politics of research funding and
shifting jurisdictions for industrial policy. This is best
uderstood by introducing a second institutional focus for public
funding of collaborative research, the Ministry of Posts and
Telecommunications and the Nippon Telegraph and Telephone
Corporation.
The Ministry of Posts and Telecommunications (MPT)
and the Nippon Telegraph and Telephone Corporation (NTT)
MPT does not share MITI's status as a "policy agency." Yet,
MPT enjoyed extraordinary powers as the prewar Ministry of
Communications (Teishinsh6) that supervised posts, maritime
shipping, railroads, civil aviation, and Japan's only experiment
with a national electric utility.81 MITI (then the Ministry of
Munitions) began encroaching on these powers during the war,
capturing the responsibility for electric power and aviation
policy that it still enjoys today. MPT's industrial policymaking
powers were further limited by Occupation reforms establishing
80 This account is from Dore (1983) and Kbgyb Gijutsu
Volume 27 Number 4 (1986).
81 See Samuels (1987) Chapter Four.
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NTT as a public monopoly, institutionally distinct (and adminis-
tratively distant) from the parent ministry. Even if reduced in
power, MPT's responsibility for administering Postal Savings and
for nominally supervising NTT throughout most of the postwar
period make MPT an important player in the bureaucratic politics
of telecommunications and research policymaking.
NTT conducts basic research in three laboratories that
together comprise its Electrical Communications Laboratory (ECL),
one of the most prestigious research institutes in Japan. Like
the Bell Labs of AT&T, three times its size, the ECL is engaged
in a wide variety of telecommunications research, including
optical communications, digital switching, large-scale inte-
gration, and integrated information systems. And like Bell Labs
(before divestiture) ECL long served a single, monopolistic
master.
This is the most important distinguishing characteristic of
the MPT/NTT research system. Unlike MITI but very much like the
US Department of Defense, NTT can procure products developed to
its own specifications. It has no production facilties, but
provides a final market for the products conceived in its labs.
While MITI benefits indirectly (through the maintenance of a
stable and growing Japanese economy) from supporting industrial
research, NTT is actually an extensive (and until recently
monopolistic) market for its client firms. Products are develop-
ed by a stable "family" of contract suppliers that have long
enjoyed special benefits from this special relationship. Whereas
MITI subsidizes research before it is undertaken, NTT pays its
contractor/family members only after their goals are reached.
These firms: NEC, Fujitsu, Oki Electric, and Hitachi, therefore
find additional incentives for collaborative research and
development activities.
A second distinguishing characteristic of NTT-funded
collaborative research is the "value added" NTT provides to these
firms. NTT not only procures their product, but engages directly
in the basic research that makes these products possible. This
research often involves family members, but as we have seen in
the case of MITI-sponsored research, even NTT "family" members
prefer to conduct their collaboration separately. Firms do not
approach NTT to propose a project, NTT initiates projects that
will meet its product needs, and will choose participants
accordingly. Once chosen, however, the benefits of research
collaboration can great. NTT may prefer to support parallel,
competing paths to the same product, but guarantees that when one
of its family members succeeds, the others are provided the
technology for its manufacture. The best example of this process
was the case of the facimile machine, developed in the ECL.8 2
82 This is based upon Doane's (1984) account of the organi-
zation and management of NTT research. See her analysis of the
DIPS case in particular. There is also limited evidence that
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The MITI-MPT relationship grew tangled and acrimonious in
the early 1980s; their "Telecom War" (in which NTT was deeply
embedded) produced the most recent and ambitious government
program for collaborative research to date, the Key Technologies
Research Promotion Center, created by the 1985 Act for the
Facilitation of Research in Key Technologies. 83 Several con-
verging developments lead to this bureaucratic war and to these
political solutions.
The first development concerned international trade fric-
tions. The special relationship between NTT and its associated
firms was assaulted by American trade negotiators in the 1980's.
They resented efforts to shelter NTT's $3 billion procurement
program from Japan's promises to liberalize trade, and believed
(incorrectly as it turned out) than an agreement for open NTT
bidding and procurement would result in American high technology
telecommunications equipment sales and reduce the bilateral trade
deficit. Complicating this was the expiration in 1985 of the
1978 "Temporary Special Measures Law for Specific Machinery and
Information Industry Promotion," known colloquially as the
Kijbh& in Japanese and as the "Targeting Law" in English.
American and European trade negotiators objected to "unfair"
advantages this law provided Japanese firms in businesses the
foreigners felt they could compete. MPT, for reasons associated
with the NTT procurement issue, and MITI, for reasons associated
with the Targeting Law, each had special incentive to finese the
intersection between research promotion and trade policy.
The second development had to do with fiscal austerity. By
this time, the Second Provisional Commission for Administrative
Reform, Rinch&, was gathering momentum. Senior LDP leaders, MOF
officials, and business leaders had long been engaged in negotia-
tions to reduce government spending and to relieve the public
treasury of financial responsibility for some of its most
inefficient operations, such as the National Railways. It
occured to private sector leaders that the NTT monopoly might
also be challenged. Rinch6 Chairman Doko Toshio, engineered the
other Japanese government agencies require firms awarded procure-
ment contracts to subcontract portions of the award to their
competitors. See the case of the National Space Development
Agency (NASDA) and the No. 1 Earth Resources Satellite contract
awarded to Mitsubishi Electric. NASDA asked Mitsubishi Electric
to "use those parts in which Nippon Electric and Toshiba are
strong." (Nihon Keizai Shimbun December 18, 1985).
83 The term "Telecom Wars" and much of this account is from
Johnson (1986). Readers interested in a thoroughly compelling
and deftly nuanced account of relations between MPT and MITI are
urged to read his essay. Note that NTT was supervised directly by
MPT until it was reorganized as a joint stock company in 1986.
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NTT presidency for his former colleague, Shinto Hisashi in
1981, placing a powerful voice for privatization within NTT for
the first time. Industry wanted a competitive presence in
telecommunications. "Adminstrative reform" also affected
research budgets. The government share of R&D spending was
already lower in Japan than in any other industrial democracy
when, in 1984, the Finance Ministry instituted its "zero minus
ceiling" budget system. MOF announced that it would disallow any
budget requests larger than the previous year's allocations. As
noted above, this reduced government R&D funding to the lowest
level among the industrial democracies.
Fiscal austerity could not have come at a worse time for
MITI, which was trying vigorously to redefine its industrial
policy mission and to enhance its role in industrial research.
MITI not only proposed increased research funding for the AIST,
but also sought approval to establish a new Basic Technology
Promotion Center for telecommunications, materials technology and
biotechnology in the fiscal 1985 budget. MOF and Rinchb stood in
MITI's path. MITI resorted to political pressure. In August
1984, for example, it gathered all former MITI Ministers to
publicly renew committments to basic and applied research. This
group, comprised of the LDP's most influential and senior
leaders, included three former prime ministers and six major
faction leaders. 84
MPT was lobbying just as vigorously to maintain and to
enhance its own administrative jurisdictions. Its problems were
far more menacing than MITI's. First, even though MPT had not
fully controlled NTT for most of the postwar period, the NTT
privatization would further dissipate MPT powers. To make
matters worse, MPT was threatened with loss of control of the
lucrative Postal Savings Program, "the world's largest financial
institution." 8 5 The private banks and MOF were each eager to
wrest control of these funds from MPT. Taken together these
developments could cripple MPT and snuff out aspirations that MPT
could again become a "policy agency" equaly to MITI or MOF.
Changes in the very nature of the telecommunications
industry aided both MIT and MPT. Bureaucratic redivisions of
labor followed close behind the extensive transformation and
fusion of traditional telecommunications businesses. The
emergence of a hybrid "information industry" out of the computer
industry (MITI's traditional jurisdiction) and a newly competi-
tive communications industry (regulation of communications
circuits is indisputably MPT's job) gave both ministries legiti-
mate claims for policy jurisdiction in the new hybrid, high
growth telecommunications business.
84 Shfkan Ty6 Keizai September 1, 1984.
85 Johnson (1986).
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At first, MITI and MPT each stood in the other's way. Each
ministry supervised separate and uncoordinated research in its
national laboratories; each stimulated and supported interfirm
research collaboration in telecommunications designed to estab-
lish it as the national telecommunications policy champion. In
1983 each initiated a separate regional information network
system: MPT's "Teletopia" and MITI's "New Media Community." In
the summer of 1984, each submitted separate draft bills outlining
a research and telecommunications research and regulatory program
that would secure its own policy jurisdicition. 86 But it was
clear that neither MOF nor the private firms would put up with
the duplication and competition for long.
The privatization of NTT provided opportunities for recon-
ciliation of MITI and MPT aspirations, a reconciliation achieved
only after extensive bureaucratic infighting and only at signi-
ficant political costs. Once it became clear that NTT shares
would be sold, MPT (fearing the loss of its research infra-
structure) proposed that a special Telecommunications Research
Promotion Center (Denki Tsishin Shink6 Kik6) be established with
funds from the sale of shares (genbutsu shusshi). MOF preferred
to use the funds to offset the fiscal deficit, a movbe that would
would have separated MPT from the NTT funds. Senior LDP politi-
cians intervened between MOF and MPT, and induced MITI to
redirect its own proposal for a new research center.
Their reconciliation required three sets of compromise. The
easiest was the name. MPT deferred to MITI here, and the MITI
proposal for a Key Technology Promotion Center was accepted. MPT
preferred that the new Center focus only on telecommunications
technology, while MITI sought a broader mandate. MITI again
prevailed. But MITI's effort to have unilateral control of the
center was rebuffed by the LDP, MOF, and business leaders. The
new Center would be controlled jointly. In the final compromise,
MITI had its financial windfall and MPT had its policy windfall.
As Johnson aptly puts it:
"The center is a typical Japanese hybrid: the product of
bureaucratic competition, funded from public but not tax
monies, and incorporating private sector supervision and
participation.,87
The Key Technology Promotion Center was established by the
Key Technology Research Facilitation Law of June 1985. It is
86 The MPT program was embodied in its draft bill:" Denki
Tsishin no Kiban Seibi H6an." MITI's was in its "J6h6 Sangy6
Kyago Kiban Han." See ShHkan Ty Keizai September 15, 1984;
Asahi Shimbun July 31, 1984. Shakan Ty6 Keizai August 11,
1984. Tsush8... (1985a).
87 Johnson (1986); also Shfikan Ty6 Keizai January 19, 1985.
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engaged in three categories of activities, providing: 1) equity
for research and development companies comprised of private firms
engaged in joint research, 2) loans to private firms (interest
repayment is conditional), and 3) basic infrastructure to collect
and diffuse scientific and technical information, to promote
international research cooperation, and to facilitate other forms
of joint research. One-third of government dividends from NTT
shareholdings are earmarked for the Center. In addition, it
receives funds directly from the Japan Development Bank, other
government financial institutions, and private firms.
Promotion of joint research is at the core of the new
Center. In order to entice private firms to spend more on basic
research, the Center provides up to 70% of the costs for the
creation of new research companies comprised of at least two
private firms. The firms are permitted to retain all patent
rights. The first group of twenty-five projects were interesting
for what was and what was not listed. On the one hand, thirteen
percent of the Center's first 2 billion yen was distributed to
local and regional governments to promote "Teletopia" projects,
MPT's term for regional information systems. This suggests that,
MITI may have been induced to compromise its own "new media
community" regional policy program. On the other hand, there was
no mention of support for a project in advanced turboprop engines
undertaken by the five major aerospace companies. These firms
announced in the Spring of 1986 that their joint development
program would be supported by Center funds. This suggests that
Center funds, like others administered by MITI, provide a
significant degree of flexibility and possibilities for diver-
sion. The Center may be best seen as yet another "recepticle"
for private firms. (For a full list of the first group of Center
Projects, see the Appendix B). The distribution of these
finances and activities in fiscal 1986 are depicted in Figure
Three below:
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FIGURE THREE
THE KEY TECHNOLOGY PROMOTION CENTER
(1986)
1/3
NTT
DIVIDES
$
GOWEIET'S
SALT/TOBACCO
WOOLY
DIVIDENDS
1L
FURDS FRI1
GUIEIIfJTI FINANCIAL
INSTI IONS
PRIVATE (APPROX. 5 BY)
FIRI .
IrEISTRIAL IVESTET SPECIAL ACCOFJT (bi) (10 BY)
2,3 BY 125 BY 5,7 BY
KEY TECHJLOGY RESEARCH PRO'TIONJ CENTER
BASIC CAPITAL (8.5 BY)
(CENTER IfRASTRUCTURE)
o PROMDTION JOINT RESEARCH | EQITY 
o ItTIONAL RESEARCH I SENTS (5.7 BY)
COOPERATION I (12.5 BY)
o RESEARCH IORITIOJ 
SHARIII4 g I ! r | _~~~~~~~~~
PRIVATE i
FIRMS 
Source: Kbgyb Gijutsu Volume 27 Number 4
PRVATE Ft I
---- I -,.---- ---- "I-
( 1986 ) p 16.
50
The Ministry of Education. Science, and Culture (Mombush6)
MITI's ambitions in basic research and the promotion of
research collaboration also encroaches upon the jurisdiction of
Mombusho, which supervises most of Japan's scientific research.
In addition to direct responsibility for the scientific research
conducted in Japan's prestigious national universities, Mombush6
supervises the research activities at ten national research
institutes, six of which are engaged in basic scientific re-
search, and all of which are encouraged to stimulate colla-
boration.
Collaboration in the basic sciences in Japan presents
special problems. Only four percent of firms responding to a
government survey reported that they sponsored research or
engaged in collaborative research with Japanese universities.
Similarly, university scientists particpated in only very limited
ways in the government-supported cooperative R&D programs
described in a separate study. 88
There are several varieties of disincentives for
university-based researchers to collaborate with others outside
their faculties. First, there is the rule of "non-additionality"
by which grants from goverment ministries other than Mombush6
automatically reduce Mombush6 support by the same amount. The
second problem is structural. It is widely believed that the
insular research groups of the science and engineering faculties
of Japan's leading universities inhibit the interaction with
industry and other research institutes. These "chairs" (koza)
are remnants of Germanic borrowing that government and industry
both hope the universities will discard. Third, many argue that
the low level of industry-sponsored research at leading Japanese
universities is derived from the antipathy of Japanese scientists
toward applied research and toward industry in particular.
Nonetheless, there have been significant changes. In 1973
Mombush6, concerned with the lack of effective coordination in
Japanese basic research, established its National InterUniversity
Research Institutes (NIURI) to centralize these activities and to
promote joint research in the basic sciences. Funds were made
available for collaboration across the government research
institutes that would also allow industry participation. 8 9 In
1986 legislation was introduced to further facilitate cooperation
between government and university researchers and industry.
Several impediments to collaboration, such as the 50% reduction
in pension allowances for visiting researchers, and restrictive
88 Rokuhara (1985) p.38-9; Inose, Nishikawa, and Uenohara
(1982) p. 5 5.
89 Eto (1984); Abe, et al. (1982); Anderson (1984) p. 89-101.
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patent ownership regulations were removed. Formal civil service
restrictions on consulting by researchers at national univer-
sities are still commonly circumvented. They receive loans of
equipment and utilize corporate research facilities quite
commonly; there are several reports that such arrangements have
often been an important source of basic research for major
industrial projects.90 Thus, despite the prevailing view that
university research is isolated from industry and despite the
hand-wringing of Japanese industry and university professors
about their lack of interaction, there is evidence that their
collaboration is both important and increasing.
The Science and Technology Agency (STA)
The STA was established in the mid-1950's to coordinate
government research and to assume jurisdiction in areas not
already controlled by existing ministries. This has never been
accomplished without substantial difficulty. Bureaucratic
rivalries with MITI over nuclear power and with Mombush6 over
space technology have become permanent parts of the STA environ-
ment. The formal division of labor with MITI has always been
defined by the distinction between basic and applied research,
with MITI assuming responsibility for the latter, and STA for the
former. However, in Japan as elsewhere, this distinction has
neither been easy to identify nor to enforce. The STA has always
been frustrated by Mombush5's "natural rights" to
university-based research and by MITI's claim to suzerainty over
industrial research. It has been difficult for the STA to
"coordinate" what it does not actually control.
As noted above, MITI authored and Diet passed the enabling
legislation for engineering research associations in 1961. The
STA responded that same year with the Japan Research and Develop-
ment Corporation (JDRC), a special public corporation under its
supervision. The objective of this new entity was to transfer
the results of government research to private industry and to
promote commercial development of government-funded basic
research. This has often involved the provision of
"success-conditional loans" from the STA to private firms.
Likewise, in apparent response to the 1981 "Next Generation" MITI
initiative, the STA's Institute of Physical and Chemical Research
(RIKEN) launched its own "Frontier Research" program in 1986.
Frontier projects focus on 15 year basic research in biological
and materials sciences, and are designed to attract foreign
90 Doane (1984) p.127; Inose, Nishikawa, and Uenohara
(1982); Anderson (1984).
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researchers.91
Like the other government agencies mentioned above, the STA
has taken recent initiatives to promote joint research and better
collaboration between industry, national laboratories, and the.
universities. In 1981 the STA, through the JDRC, established the
Exploratory Research for Advanced Technology Organization
(ERATO), as its own instrument to promote basic collaborative
research. ERATO's mission, to engage and combine the expertise
of researchers from firms, universities and government labs, is
limited to small groups for five year projects. No bricks and
mortar funding is available, and as the JRDC has no facilities of
its own, research is conducted in rented space, often at nearly
three dozen geographicaly dispersed company and university labs.
ERATO stresses individuals over organizations. Indeed, ERATO
selects scientists for their creativity, youth (they must be
younger than thirty-five), and (often) foreign research experi-
ence. Many are seconded from private firms. By early 1985 the
ERATO projects had produced 260 professional papers and (despite
being limited to basic research) 170 patent applications. Patent
rights are shared equally by the JRDC and the inventor. (A list
of current ERATO projects and participants is in Appendix C.)
Reviewing the Japanese Policy Context
This review of public institutions and public policy
suggests that in Japan it may be more difficult to persuade
ministries than to persuade firms of the advantages of coopera-
tion. Given the value of proprietary information in competitive
markets, this is more than a little surprising. But bureaucratic
politics can be overwhelmingly inertial and narrow in Japan, and
this may provide additional research strategies to firms. For
firms, generic technologies are a resource cost, while propri-
etary ones are a resource generator. Bureaucracies, on the other
hand, have only costs, especially under conditions of austerity.
They can spend, but they ordinarily cannot generate resources.
Thus, competition among ministries cannot be differentiated in
the same way as competition among firms. Success is measured
only by budget share and jurisdiction. While we anticipated that
the functional fragmentation of the Japanese bureaucracy might
affect patterns of institutional support for interfirm collabora-
tion, the opportunities it provides firms suggests a more general
problem for policy analysis.
91 Note that this project is not to be confused with the
"Human Frontier Science Program," an initiative in the biological
sciences undertaken by MITI in 1987 with the support of the Prime
Minister.
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The best data available on the actual flow and disbursement
of research funding in Japan shows that industry is the big
winner in every respect (See Figure Four). Total industrial
research spending is greater than that for universities or
government laboratories, and industry receives.a greater flow of
external research support than either of the other two.
Moreover, Japanese industry funds nearly as much foreign as
domestic research. In sum, just as there can be no understanding
of collaborative research in Japan without understanding the
basic process of industrial research, so too there can be no
understanding industrial research without seeing how it is
embedded in the broader policy and institutional environment:
FIGURE FOUR
THE FLOW OF JAPANESE SCIENTIFIC AND TECHNICAL RESEARCH SPENDING
(1984)
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VI. CONCLUSIONS
Research collaboration in Japan is well fabled, but is not
yet well enough studied. Some perspective is in order. For all
the talk about how national projects and cooperative ventures
dominate Japan's research agenda,9 2 interfirm research collabora-
tion remains the lesser part of Japanese research efforts.
Although collaboration is found in all major industrial sectors,
and although government-funding can be involved, firms' most
important research is not done in joint facilties. Proprietary
research still accounts for the largest share by far of Japanese
research spending. Two-thirds of all research projects are
conducted by firms alone. Half of the remaining one-third is
interfirm research. The rest is collaboration between firms and
national labs, universities, and other research institutes. 93
Dore (1983) raises important questions about nationalism and
Japanese culture that cannot be ignored:
"Information is perhaps more readily shared in Japan
than in most countries...This is partly a function of
nationalism and a sense of the need to catch up. It is
also partly a reflection of the ... guild tradition of
competitor cooperation in industry associations."
In his view, the facility of information flows and an underlying
collective nationalism combine with a neutral and respected
public institutions to enhance the willingness of firms to
collaborate. Does the evidence reviewed here suggest that models
of Japanese consensus and collaboration are outdated? Or
conversely, do approaches that devalue cultural explanations of
Japanese collaboration miss the fundamental causal relationships?
We have seen that even nominally collaborative projects are
structured to protect the proprietary interests of the parti-
cipating firms. Thus, while it is quite clear that the Japanese
have never been burdened with the idea that cooperation upstream
92 See, for example, references to joint research as a
"Japanese trademark" in the Federal Government's JTECH Telecom-
munications Report of January 1986. Note also, however, that the
Japanese do not see their cooperative research practices as
particularly well advanced. Rokuhara (1985) is an example.
93 Rokuhara (1985) p.3 2 . The Sakakibara and Otaki
(1984) survey of more than 300 Japanese firms found that research
and sales/marketing groups were far more important sources of
technical information than were other firms in the same business,
academics, or suppliers. In their list of how research is
activated, "confidential communications with in-house research
labs and with other parts of the firm," "foreign study," and
other mechanisms were most important. Joint research was not even
on their list.
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in research is incompatible with competition downstream in
markets, it is far from clear that models of consensual, harmon-
ious, cooperative Japanese practices permit us the fully nuanced
interpretation we are seeking. Nationalism is important, but it
is not enough.
Although the image may be one of cooperation implemented
through shared tasks leading to synergies and innovation, the
reality is more commonly one of cooperation implemented through
divided tasks; innovation is probably derived from economy. We
can be sure that the Japanese work hard at finding ways to econo-
mize and streamline the technology process. We can be equally
sure that their solutions protect cooperative separation' as
much as they encourage genuinely integrated collaboration. Just
as oligopoly and competition coexist in (and indeed define) the
Japanese economy generally, so does their balance define the
Japanese technology process. It is no surprise that as the
Japanese increase their investment in innovation that they do so
in culturally comfortable and historically consistent ways- by
ignoring antitrust concerns and by reinforcing oligopolies. It
is left for the bureaucracy to ameliorate the worst effects of
the transformation of product oligopolies into technology oligo-
polies. On the basis of our limited evidence, it seems that this
concern is less important to bureaucrats than is the protection
of their own jurisdictions. To repeat, in Japan it is arguably
more difficult to get bureacrats to collaborate than to get firms
to do so.
To the extent that there is genuine collaboration, evidence
is mixed about motives and causality. The Office of Technology
Assessment has evaluated Japanese joint microelectronics research
and concludes that:
"...the actual extent of interaction among partici-
pating firms was limited...It appears that the organi-
zational form involved a compromise between attempts to
encourage individual interactions- with objectives such
as stimulating personnel development- and the more
concrete technical goals."94
This speaks perceptively to the influence of labor markets and
firms size on patterns of research collaboration. It plausibly
suggests that government support may be neither necessary nor
sufficient for some forms of interfirm research collaboration in
94 Office of Technology Assessment, ed., 1983 p. 4 1 8 . Note
that Yamamura (1984), citing a Chb Kbron essay (Fall 1981),
argues persuasively that joint research is as important to the
Japanese for stimulating researchers competitively as for
exchanging technological information. As well, Okimoto (forth-
coming) argues that the real contribution of collaborative
research in Japan remains the circulation of information and the
overall boost they provide research budgets.
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Japan.
There is some evidence that speaks to the role of Japan's
industrial and financial groups in promoting collaborative
research. The OTA reported that, based on patterns of con-
tracting in microelectronics, once participants in a joint
project complete their basic research and move toward product
development, interfirm cooperation declines in Japan. Our
somewhat broader evidence allows a slightly revised
interpretation. Clearly, interfirm collaboration for product
development is common in Japan; indeed it is the modal form of
joint research. We conclude not that interfirm cooperation
declines as products move to market, but that it shifts from
horizontal to vertical forms. While the secondary evidence on
this point does suggest that this shift is facilitated in Japan
by the nature of the keiretsu groups, it also points to a
significant intergroup and cross-sectoral, or "diagonal" col-
laborative dynamic.95
The possibility that "signaling" by the Japanese government
of a particular high technology area through the creation of a
well publicized joint research project is a functional substitute
for underdeveloped equity markets remains intriguing. It must be
tempered by our observation, however, that firms seem to deploy
sufficient resources for research, and even for joint research,
when they are determined to do so. The creation of formal
"recepticles" to receive public funds is not evidence of compen-
sation or functional substitution. Admittedly, more research
remains to be done.96
Finally, the Japanese case suggests several points of
considerable comparative interest. First, we observe a suc-
cessful transition from collaboration for technology diffusion to
collaboration for technology development. Instruments designed
to facilitate this diffusion among small and medium sized firms
are transformed into powerful, centralized instruments for
95 We cannot rule out MITI as an important facilitator of
these "diagonal" associations. Note its role in the formation of
the Aircraft Core Technology Center in October 1985. Shimadzu,
Teijin Seiki, Toshiba, NEC, Toray, and Kobe Steel joined to
facilitate international joint development of aircraft parts and
materials.
96 The best statement of the "compensatory" explanations
for joint research in Japan is Saxonhouse (1985). More work also
needs to be done on the "free rider" problem. There is little
systematic analysis of the extent to which technology, collabora-
tively developed, is diffused to non-participants. Saxonhouse
looks at data from seven government research consortia and
concludes that there is very little relationship between partici-
pation and change in market share. Non-participants seemed to do
just as well as participants.
I OL
57
technological development serving giant firms. Standard objec-
tions to research collaboration, including high management costs,
free riders, diluted benefits, and reduced technological options
are each finessed in Japanese practice. Japan may be a singular
case in which competition is stimulated, rather than inhibited by
joint research and extensive conversation among competitors. We
are reminded that above all else, Japanese competitors are
pragmatic. The stability of their positions in markets allows
them to consistently weigh the negative, restrictive effects of
collaboration against potential new efficiencies, and to learn
how to live with the costs while capturing considerable
benefits. Collaborative science may indeed be a Japanese art,
but it seems as much related to economic and administrative
structure as to culture.
_I _
APPENDIX A
Engineering Research Associations (Gijutsu Kenkyu Kumiai)
in Japan, 1961-1986
ERA No. and topic/
name in Japanese
Firm
No.
Period Firms
1. High polymer materials
(Kobunshi genryo gijutsu
kenkyu kumiai)
2. High grade industrial
alcohol (Kokyu alcohol
kogyoka gijutsu kenkyu kumiai)
3. "Wool yarn"_laboratory
(Gijutsu kenkyu kumiai
amachi kenkyujo)
4. Creep testing
(Creep shiken gijutsu
kenkyu kumiai)
5. Optical engineering
(Kogaku kogyo gijutsu
kenkyu kumiai)
6. Preferential refining
(Yusen seiren gijutsu
kenkyu kumiai)
7. Electronic computers
(Denshi keisanki gijutsu
kenkyu kumiai [FONTAC])
8. Solvent dyeing of wool
(Yomo seihin yozai senshoku
gijutsu kenkyu kumiai)
9. Casting technology
(Naniwa imono gijutsu kenkyu
kumiai [Rosoku] - Osaka)
10. Shock absorbing packaging
(Kanshozai gijutsu kenkyu
kumiai)
11. Aluminum electrolysis
(Arumi hyomen shori gijutsu
kenkyu kumiai)
23 10/61-4/77
3 11/61-2/72
7 2/62-4/77
22 3/62-5/69
45 6/62-1/81
3 9/62-3/64
3 9/62-11/72
4 10/62-2/67
18 1/63-11/74
6 4/64-4/79
33 2/65-5/83
Asahi Kasei,
Asahi Glass, Aginomoto
Kureha Kagaku, Showa
Denko, et al.
Maruzen Oil,
Hitachi, Nippon Soda
Daido Keori,Daido Bomo
et al.
Yawata Steel
Asahi Kogaku,
Cannon Camera
Fuji Steel,
Daido Steel
Fujitsu, NEC, Oki
Kataoka Keori,
Asahi Denka kogyo
Small Casting
Companies in Osaka
Koku Kikaku Konpo,
et al.
Showa Koki,
Kobe-Northrup
--------- --------------------
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212. Coal calcination (using
heavy oil)
(Sekkai juyu shosei gijutsu
kenkyu kumiai)
13. Car components (pollu-
tion and safety research)
(Jidosha kogai anzen kiki
gijutsu kenkyu kumiai)
14. Car components
(Sogo jidosha_anzen kogai
gijutsu kenkyu kumiai)
15. Light metal
composite materials
(Keikinzoku fukugozai
gijutsu kenkyu kumiai)
16._Super computers
(Cho koseino computer kaihatsu
gijutsu kenkyu kumiai)
17. New computer series
(Shin computer series
gijutsu kenkyu kumiai)
18. Super computers
(Cho koseino denshi keisanki
gijutsu kenkyu kumiai)
19. Medical instruments
(Iyo kiki anzen gijutsu
kenkyu kumiai)
* 20. Nuclear powered
steel making
(Gensyhiryoku seitetsu gijutsu
kenkyu kumiai)
21. Nitrogen oxide prevention
(sintering)
(Tekkogyo chisso sankabutsu
bojo gijutsu kenkyu kumiai)
22. Software for management
planning
(Keieikanri software module
gijutsu kenkyu kumiai)
38 8/65-5/80
7 2/71-
6 12/71-
26 12/71-7/76
5 8/71-3/84
5 8/72-5/84
3 8/72-5/84
11 4/73-5/85
13 5/73-12/81
9 3/74-3/80
5 3/74-
Calcination firms
Hitachi, Jidosha,
Denki Kogyo, Hanshin
Electronic, et al.
Mitsubishi Electric,
Nippon Air Break,
Mikuni Kogyo, Mitsuba
Denki, et al.
Nippon Light Metals,
Sumitomo Chemical,
Showa Denko, et al.
Fujitsu, Fujitsu Lab.,
Hitachi, et al.
NEC, Toshiba, Nippon
Business Automation,
et al.
Mitsubishi, Mitsubishi
Research Institute,
Oki Denki
Shinazu Seisakujo,
Toshiba, Nippon Koden,
NEC
Nippon Steel, Nippon
Kokan, Kawasaki Steel,
Mitsubishi Heavy
Industires,
Ishikawajima Harima,
et al.
Nippon Steel, Nippon
Kokan, Kawasaki Steel,
Sumitomo Metals, et al
Nippon Computer System
Kinki Computer
Consultant, James A.
Systems, et al.
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323. Software for
administrative processing
(Jimushori software module
gijutsu kenkyu kumiai)
24. Software for design and
and computation
(Sekkei keisan software module
gijutsu kenkyu kumiai)
25. Software for operations
research
(Operation research keisan
software module gijutsu
kenkyu kumiai)
26. Software for automatic
control
(Jidoseigyo software module
gijutsu kenkyu kumiai)
27. Automatic measurements
(Jidokeisoku gijutsu kenkyu
Kumiai)
28. High temperature struc-
tural safety
(Koon kozo anzen gijutsu
kenkyu kumiai)
* 29. Traffic control system
(Jidosha sogo kansei gijutsu
kenkyu kumiai)
30. Vinylchloride_safety
(Enka Vinyl kankyo gijutsu
kenkyu kumiai)
* 31. Olefins from heavy oil
(Jushitsuyu kagaku genryoka
gijutsu kenkyu kumiai)
* 32. Jet engine
(Kokukiyo Jet Engine gijutsu
kenkyu kumiai)
33. VLSI
(Cho LSI gijutsu kenkyu
kumiai)
14 3/74-
5 3/74-
8 3/74-
4 3/74-
7 5/74-
24 9/74
10 11/74-4/80
21 4/75-6/83
6 7/75-11/83
3 3/76-
7 3/76-
Nippon Denshi Kaihatsu
Nippon Time Share,
Computer Service,
Jimu Keisan Center, et
al.
Kozo Keikaku Kenkujo
Kaihatsu Keisan Center
Fuyo Joho Center, et
al.
Kyoei Keisan Center,
Computer Engineers,
Techno System,
Tochiku Software, et
al.
Kanri Kogoku Kenkyujo,
Software Research
Assoc., Nippon Auto-
mation System, et al.
Ando Electric,
Adachi Electric,
Iwasaki Tsushinki et
al.
Asahi Kasei,
Kawasaki Heavy
Industries, Toshiba,
Hitachi, Mitsubishi
Heavy Industries
NEC, Hitachi,
Tateishi Electric,
Toyota, et al.
Asahi Glass,
Kureha Chemical,
Shinetsu chemical, et
al.
Idemitsu-Kosan,
Showa-Denko,
Sumitomo-Kagaku
Ishikawajima Harima,
Kawasaki Heavy
Industries, Mitsubishi
Heavy Industries
Computer Sogo Kenkyujo
NEC, Toshiba,
Joho System, et al.
aasrrr
434. High capacity, low cost
medical instruments
(Gijutsu kenkyu kumiai iryo
fukushi kiki kenkyusho)
35. New housing supply
systems
(Shin jutaku ykyokyu System
gijutsu kenkyu kumiai)
* 36. PIPS pattern information
processing_system
(Pattern joho shori system
gijutsu kenkyu kumiai)
* 37. Electric car
(Denki jidosha gijutsu
kenkyu kumiai)
* 38. Undersea oil production
(Gijutsu kenkyu kumiai kaitei
sekiyu seisan system kenkyu)
* 39. Flexible manufacturing
system
(Laser oyo fukugo seisan
system gijutsu kenkyu kumiai)
40. High efficiency gas
turbine
(Ko koritsu Gas Turbine
gijutsu kenkyu kumiai)
41. Heavy oil technologies
(Jushitsuyu taisaku
gijutsu kenkyu kumiai)
42. Fifth Generation Computer
(Denshi keisanki kihon
gijutsu kenkyu kumiai)
43. New fuel oil technology
(Shin nenryoyu kaihatsu
gijutsu kenkyu kumiai)
44. Polymer applications
(Kobunshi oyo gijutsu
kenkyu kumiai)
43 8/76-
11 2/77-11/79
5 3/77-5/82
11 2/78-
18 3/78-9/85
20 4/78-
14 9/78-
31 6/79-
10 7/79-
22 6/80-
8 7/80-7/85
Asahi Kasei, Toshiba,
Hitachi, Nippon Koden
Kurare, Takeda Pharm.,
Sanyo, et al.
Takenaka Komuten,
Nippon Steel, et al.
Toshiba, NEC,
Hitachi, et al.
Daihatsu, Mazda,
Hitachi,
Nippon Denchi
Arabian Oil,
Ishikawajima Harima,
Nippon Steel,
Hitachi Shipbuilding
Toshiba Machinery,
Aida Engineering,
Mitsubishi Electric,
et al.
Asahi Glass,
Ishikawajima Harima,
Central Electric
Power Research
Institute, et al.
Showa Shell Sekiyu
Ishikawajima Harima,
Idemitsu Kosan,
Kashima Sekiyu
Kawasaki Steel, et al.
Computer Sogo Kenkyujo
Fujitsu, Hitachi, et
al.
Mitsubishi Oil,
Ajinomoto, Idemitsu
Kosan, Kansai Paint,
et al.
Asahi Kasei,
Asahi Glass, Teijin,
Toray, et al.
.._ I_____l___l^lq________
545. Residential area waste
disposal
(Teijukenyo haisuishorikikai
system gijutsu kenkyu kumiai)
* 46. Carbon monoxide
as a raw material
(C, kagaku gijutsu
kenkyu kumiai)
47. Optical applications for
measurement and control systems
(Hikari oyo system gijutsu
kenkyu kumiai)
48. Small system gas powered
air cooling
(Kogata gas reibo gijutsu
kenkyu kumiai)
49. Synthetic dyes
(Gosei senryo gijutsu kenkyu
kumiai)
** 50. Fine ceramics
(Fine ceramics gijutsu
kenkyu kumiai)
** 51. Biotechnology development
(Biotechnology kaihatsu
gijutsu kenkyu kumiai)
** 52. Polymer technology
(Kobunshi kiban gijutsu
kenkyu kumiai)
* 53. High speed computers
for science and technology
(Kagaku gijutsuyo kosoku keisan
system gijutsu kenkyu kumiai)
* 54. Manganese nodule mining
(Gijutsu kenkyu kumiai
Manganese dankai saiko system
kenkyujo)
55. Industrial furnaces
(Gijutsu kenkyu kumiai kogyoro
gijutsu kenkyujo)
8 7/80-
16 10/80-
15 1/81-
15 7/81-
5 7/81-
15 8/81-
14 8/81-
11 8/81-
6 12/81-
20 1/82-
7 9/82-
Ebara ,nfilco,
Kurita Industries,
Takenak'a Komuten, et
al.
Mitsubishi Kasei,
Ube Kosan,
Daicei, et al.
Hikari Sangyo Gijutsu
Shink "Kyokai,
Fujit l, Mitsubishi
Electri!c, et al.
Tokyo 'Gas, Osaka Gas,
Matsushita Electric
Nippon Chemical,
Mitsuilshi Kasei,
Sumitio Kasei,
Hodogaa Chemical
jl~!i i1
Toshii, Asahi Glass
Kyocei:', et al.
Mitsubishi Kasei,
Kyowa Hakko,
Sumitom Chemical, et
al.
Toray,
Mitsubishi Kasei,
AsahiliGlass, et al.
FujitSu, Oki Electric,
Toshiba, NEC,
Hitachi, Mitsubishi
Electric
Ishikawaiima Harima,
Osaka Syosen,
Kinzoiu Jigyodan
Mitsui Senpaku
Ishikawajima Harima,
Isoralt Kogyo,
Chino'Seisakujo et al.
rsr------------- 1__I__I..______
656. Basic refining technology
(Seiren shinkiban gijutsu
kenkyu kumiai)
57. Oxygen burning for high
quality polymers
(Sanso fukamaku nensho
gijutsu kenkyu kumiai)
58. Paper production
(Seishi gijutsu kenkyu kumiai
59. Crude oil refining
(Genyu Ni-sanji kaishu
gijutsu kenkyu kumiai)
60. Energy development
(Energy kaihatsuyo kaimen
kasseizai gijutsu kenkyu
kumiai)
* 61. Automatic sewing system
(Jidohosei system
gijutsu kenkyu kumiai)
62. Coal extraction and
mining equipment technologies
(Sekitan Rotenbori kikai
gijutsu kenkyu kumiai)
63. New aluminum refining
process
(Aluminium shin seiren
gijutsu kenkyu kumiai)
64. New uses for light oil
(Keishitsuyubun shinyoto
kaihatsu gijutsu kenkyu kumiai)
65. High efficiency synthetic
fibers
(Ko koritsu gosen gijutsu
kenkyu kumiai)
66. New production of
chemicals using biotechnology
(Seitai kino riyo kagakuhin
shin seizo gijutsu
kenkyu kumiai)
16 9/82-
7 9/82-
26 9/82-
11 11/82-
6 11/82-
29 12/82-
11 3/83-
7 4/83-
21 5/83-
8 9/83-
7 9/83-
Nippon Steel,
Nippon Kokan,
Kawasaki Steel,
Sumitomo Metals, et
al.
Asahi Glass
Teijin, Toyo boseki,
Toray, et al.
Oji Paper, Jujyo Paper
Honshu Paper,
Mitsubishi
Arabian Oil, Imperial
Oil, Nippon Kokan, et
al.
Daiichi Kogyo Seiyaku,
Kao Soap, Lion, et al.
Aishin Seiki, Asahi
Chemical
Kawasaki Heavy
Industries, Hitachi,
Bridgestone Tire,
et al.
Nippon Light Metals,
Showa Light Metals,
Mitsui Aluminium
Asahi Chemical,
Koa Oil,
Idemitsu Kosan
Asahi Chemical,
Kanebo, Teijin, et al.
Ajinomoto,
Kao Soap,
Mitsubishi Chemicals
_ ____1__11___11___·11jlilllll .r--I-. · ·-------· ··I·-···-^----I_-__--
767. Electricity conducting
inorganic compounds
(Dodensei mukikagobutsu
gijutsu kenkyu kumiai)
68. New production methods
for high quality resins
(Koseino jushi shinseizo
gijutsu kenkyu kumiai)
69. Aluminum powder metallurgy
(Aluminium funmatsu yakin
gijutsu kenkyu kumiai)
70. Shape memory alloys
(Keijo kioku gokin
gijutsu kenkyu kumiai)
71. Development of alcohol
for fuel use
(Nenryoyo alcohol kaihatsu
gijutsu kenkyu kumiai)
72. Industrial robot
(Kyokugen sagyo robotto gijutsu
kenkyu kumiai)
73. Alkali battery
(Arukari kandenchi gijutsu
kenkyu kumiai)
5 9/83-
5 9/83-
9 9/83-
6 9/83-
7 11/83-
20 2/84-
6 9/84-
Sumitomo Denki Kogyo,
Nihon Ita Glass,
Hitachi, et al.
Mitsui Sekiyu Kagaku
Mitsubishi Chemical,
Kurare
Kobe Steel,
Showa Aluminium,
Sky Aluminium
Furukawa Denki,
Dowa Industries,
Tohoku Metals, et al.
Kannan Paint,
Kirin Beer,
Suntory, et al.
Ishikawajima Harima,
Oki Electric,
Kawasaki Heavy
Industries
Sanyo Duracell,
Toshiba,
Toyo Takasago Denchi
74. Remote sensing system for 13
resources
(Shigen remotto sensingu skisutemu
gijutsu kenkyu kumiai)
1/85- Mitsubishi Electric,
Toshiba, NEC, Hitachi
75. Super heat pump energy
accumulation system
(Supa hto ponpu enerugi
shuseki shisutemu gijutsu
kenkyu kumiai)
17 4/85- Ebara Seisakujo,
Kobe Steel,
Maekawa Seisakujo
Mitsui Shipbuilding,
Ishikawajima Harima,
76. New material and equipment 30
system for apartment development
(Shugo jutauyo shinzairyo kiki
shisutemu kaihatsu gijutsu
kenkyu kumiai)
7/85- Asahi Glass, INAX,
Osaka Gas, Obayashi
Gumi, Kashima,
Ebara Seisakujo,
Kyushu Matsushita
Denki
 .
877. Next generation
equipment for nuclear power
(Gijutsu kenkyu kumiai
genshiryokyo giseidai kiki
kaihatsu kenkyujo)
78. Toyama Prefecture
regional system development
(Toyamaken chiiki shisutemu
kaihatsu gijutsu kenkyu kumiai)
79. Water purification and
energy recovery systems
(Akuarunesansu gijutsu
kenkyu kumiai)
29 10/85-
13 10/85-
22 12/85-
Tokyo Electric Power,
Kobe Steel, Nippon
Mining, Hitachi,
Mitsubishi Heavy
Industries
Saito Seisakujo,
Intech, Silver Jushi
Kogyo, et al.
Ebara Seisakujo,
Orugano Kubota Tekko,
Karita Kogyo,
Kobe Steel, et al.
* = Designated Large Scale National Project
** = Designated Part of Next Generation Basic Technology Program
Sources: Kogyo Gijutsu In, 1986;
Sigurdson, 1986
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APPENDIX B
INITIAL JAPAN KEY TECHNOLOGY CENTER PROJECTS (1986)
No. Firm Center Funding Members
(million yen)
1. Non-Oxide Glass
2. Second Generation
Opto-Electronic
Integrated Circuits
3. Space Environment
Studies
4. Coherent Light
Communication
Measurement
Technologies
5. Gene Technologies
and Peptide Synthesis
6. Protein Engineering
7. Video Information
System
8. Synchotron Radiation
Application
Technologies
9. High Performance
Surface Metals
10. Electronic Dictionary
for Natural Language
Processing
11. Human Audio and
Visual Sensor
Mechanisms
2
13
6
5
2
5
3
13
17
8
41
12. Automatic Interpreting 41
13. Intelligent
Communications
System
41
35
100
75
90
30
200
80
150
35
200
130
210
110
Nippon Sheet Glass, Hoya
NEC, Oki, Sumitomo Electric,
Toshiba, et al.
Ishikawajima-Harima, Toshiba,
NEC, Hitachi, et al.
Yokogawa Hokushin Electric,
Advantest, Ando Electric,
et al.
Meiji Seika and Daicel Chemical
Mitsubishi Chemical,
Kyowa Hakko Kogyo,
Takeda Chemical, et al.
Sumitomo Electric, Fujitsu,
Matsushita
Mitsubishi Electric, Toshiba,
NEC, Hitachi, et al.
Nippon Kokan, Nippon Steel,
Kawasaki Steel, et al.
Fujitsu, Toshiba, Hitachi,
Oki, et al.
ATR International, NTT, KDD,
Kansai Electric Power,
IBM Japan, et al.
ATR International, NTT, KDD,
Sumitomo Metals, IBM Japan,
et al.
ATR International, NTT, KDD,
Sony, IBM Japan, et al.
Project
f
I - b --· -- -- ' - ------- --
214. Optical Microwave
Telecommunications
15. Integrated Information/
Communication Systems
for Buildings
16. Voice Activating
Associative-Type
Information Storage
and Communication
Systems for Personal
Computers
17. Joint Backup
Communications
Systems
18. Information System for
Wholesale Dealer
Complexes
19. Kumamoto Information
and Guide System
20. Regional Information
Systems
21. Integrated Information
System for Greater
Suwa Teletopia
22. Yamaguchi Triangle
Teletopia Information
System
23. INF Integrated
Information Systems
24. Kurume Teletopia
Information System
25. Kagoshima Videotex
System
41
3
4
105
64
20
5 105
8 5
42 10
9 70
38 70
19 40
L62
43
20
30
1629
ATR International, NTT, KDD,
Toshiba, IBM Japan, et al.
Fujitsu, Shimizu, Taisei
Carry Laboratories,
MAC (Japan) Ltd., Crystal Soft,
T&E
Seibu Information Center,
System Brain, Dai Nippon
Computer Systems, et al.
Takasaki City, Takasaki
Wholesalers Assoc.,
Gunma Bank, et al.
Kumamoto Prefecture,
Kumamoto City, NTT, et al.
Shimane Prefecture, Matsue City
San-in Godo Bank, et al.
Six Cities and Towns in Suwa
District, Nagano Prefecture,
Seiko-Epson, et al.
Tamaguchi Prefecture,
Tamaguchi City, NTT, et al.
Fukushima Prefecture,
Fukushima City, NTT, et al.
Kurume City, Saga Bank, NTT,
et al.
Kagoshima Prefecture,
Kagoshima City, Minami Nippon
Shimbun, et al.
Source: US National Science Foundation, Tokyo Report, Memorandum 98,
April 23, 1986
_II_ _ _
APPENDIX C
EXPLORATORY RESEARCH IN ADVANCED TECHNOLOGY ORGANIZATION PROJECTS
(1986)
Project Subgroups Participants
Ultra-Fine Particles
Amorphous & Inter-
calation Compounds
Fine Polymers
Perfect Crystal Project
Bioholonics Project
Bioinformation Transfer
Project
Superbugs Project
Nano-Mechanism Project
Basic Properties
Physical Applications
Biological/Chemical
Applications
Formation Process
Basic Properties
Amorphous Compounds
Amorphous Thin Films
Special Ceramics
Intercalation Compounds
Molecular Design
Selective Functional
Materials
Organic Electronic
Materials
Fundamental Structure
Super High-Speed Element
Perfect Crystal Growth
Optical Function Element
Basic Design
Self-Control
System Construction
Bio-Transmitters
Neurotransmission
Neuropharmacodynamics
Fundamental Works
Metabolisms and
Producti on
Tolerance Introduction
Basis Analyses
Measurement and Control
Processing
Meijo University
Stanley Electric
Stanley Electric
ULVAC
Electric and Magnetic
Alloys Research Institute
Otsuka Chemic'a 1l
Gakushuin University
Furukawa Electric
Electric and''Magnetic Alloys
Research Institute
Sophia University
Mitsubishi Chemical Industrial
Matsushita Research Institute
Semiconductor Research
Institute
Mitsubishi Electric
Mitsubishi Me tals
Hamamatsu Phototonics Co.
Teikyo University
Osaka Medical, College
Nippon Shinyaku
Nippon Shinyaku
Riken (Institute of Physical
& Chemical Research)
Riken
Hamamatsu Photonics
Tsukuba Research Coinsortium
Tsukuba Research Consortium
Nippon Kogaku'
1. -_ i __
2Solid Surface Project Basic Properties
Reactivities
Functional Structures
Tsukuba Research Consortium
Tsukuba Research Consortium
Toray
Quantum Magneto Flux
Logic
Molecular Dynamics
Assembly
Bi ophoton
n/a n/a
n/a
n/a
n/a
n/a
-1._.._·__11_1__1--- __· -·- -I-r- --I-- ---L--
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